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LAXITY AT THE GATES: THE SEC'S NEGLECT TO
ENFORCE CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY
Marc. I. Steinbergt and Forrest C. Robertstt
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) emphasizes the
importance of holding gatekeepers accountable in order to hep effectuate
lay) compliance and sound corporategovernancepractices. This Article
shows that the SECs assertions, nlith respect to individuals at the large
enterprises, is mere "'awboning." This inaction is pu.ZZng as the
SEC, from a civil enforcement perspective, has greater statutog
authority than does even the U.S. Department ofJustice in promoting
compliance with the rule of lay.
This Article examines the SECs refusalto pursue enforcement actions
premised on control person and failure to supervise Rabiity against
allegedy culpable executives, directors, and other subject persons. This
failure is seen most recently by the Commission's refusal to institute
enforcement actions against corporate insiders in the aftermath of the
financial collapse of 2008. Instead, allegedy blameworthp pubkcytraded companies have paid huge monetag penalties-apunishment
which directly harms innocent shareholders-'hile allegedy culpable
insiders largey have avoidedgovernment scrtin).
In this Article, we will explain that by invoking the controlpersonand
failure to superviseprovisions, the SEC would incentiviZe subject
individuals to fulfill their statutog obkgations. In undertaking this
t

it

Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. Earlier in
his career, Professor Steinberg served as an attorney in the SEC's Division of
Enforcement as well as special counsel to the SEC's General Counsel.
J.D., SMU Dedman School of Law.

Copyright C 2017 Virginia Law & Business Review Association

201

202

11:2 (2017)

V/irginia Lay, & Business Review

task, the Article: (1) discusses the legal authority granting the
Commission the authority to utikge these statutog provisions; (2)
explains the advantages that these provisions provide over those
normally employed by the SEC; (3) addresses recent alleged misconduct
resulting in huge monetag settlements gith several major financial
institutions; (4) sets forth possible rationales explaining w'hy the SEC
has deckned to invoke these provisions against individuals at the "beg
player" enterpises; and (5) proposes an enforcement framework that
w'ouldpromote sound corporategovernancepractices and compkance w'ith
the rule of lay).
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"[1 he pubkc in the past has sustained severe losses through practices
neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons and corporations
selkng securities."'

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 29, 1933
"Wall Street executives who pursued reckless products and activities
thep did not understand brought our financial sstem to this crisis.
Many of the boards that were supposed to look out for shareholders'
interestsfailed at this most basic ofjobs. "2

Senator Jack Reed, Hearing Regarding Dodd-Frank Act of
2010

-

"Sevenyears later. No admission ofguilt. No individuals are going to
jail. A payment that's barely afraction of the bilkons investors lost
and the trillions our economy lost - because of this fraud. .. . That's
notjustice - it's a whiteflag of surrender."3

Senator Elizabeth Warren, January 15, 2016
I. INTRODUCTION
of corporate
were born out of a mistrust
laws justification
4
securities
federal
he
insiders.
Indeed,
a major
of the Securities Acts of 1933 and
1934 was the absence of a practical means to impose liability on those

T

FederalSecurities Act: Headg on H.R. 4314 To Providefor the Furnishi of Aformaon and the
Supervision of Traffic in Investment Secudies in Interstate Commerce Before the H. Com . on Interstate
&Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong. 1 (1933) (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
2 Protecikg Shareholdersand Enhanng Publc Confidence bj Improving Corporate Go ernance: Heaing
on Examinig the Improvement of Coporate Governance for the Protecton of Shareholders and the
Enhancement of Public Confidence Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the H. Comm. on
Banking, Hous, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jack Reed,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv.).
3
U.S.
Senator
Elizabeth
Warren,
FACEBOOK
(Jan.
15,
2016),
https://www.facebook.com/senatorelizabethwarren/posts/546470835515414.
See FederalSecuritesAct: Hearing on H.R. 4314 To Providefor the Furnishi of Informaon & the
Supervision of Traffic in Investment Secuities in Interstate Commerce Before the H. Comm. on Interstate
& Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong. 1 (1933) (Statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt);
Loftus C. Carson, II, The Liabity of Controling Persons Under the Federal Secudies Acts, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 263, 269 (1997); James M. Landis, The Legislave HstoU of the
SecuriesAct of 1933,28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29, 30 (1959).
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individuals who were responsible for the collapse of the stock market in
1929.5 Unfortunately, in the wake of the largest financial crisis since the
Great Depression, 6 this objective has been largely forgotten by the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission").
The corporate
insiders principally responsible for the financial collapse of 2008 have, for the
most part, escaped with little discipline. Even in light of criticism over the
lack of individual accountability, the SEC continues its refusal to call out
fiduciaries who have a duty to help ensure that their respective enterprises
comply with the law.7
Instead, allegedly blameworthy publicly-traded companies have paid huge
monetary penalties 8-a
punishment which directly harms their innocent
9
shareholders -while
culpable executives who turned a blind eye to

5

See Landis, supranote 4, at 30 ("It indicted a system as a whole that had failed miserably in
imposing those essential fiduciary standards that should govern persons whose function it
was to handle other people's money. Investment bankers, brokers and dealers, corporate
directors, accountants, all found themselves the object of criticism so severe that the
American public lost much of its faith in professions that had theretofore been regarded
with a respect that had approached awe.").

6

E.g., John Hilsenrath, Serena Ng & Damian Paletta, Worst Cisis Since 3' 0 s, with No End Yet
in
Seght,
WALL
ST.
J.,
(Sept.
18,
2008),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122169431617549947.
See, e.g., Aruna Viswanatha, Cisis-EraCase Has OddbalEnding WALL ST.J., Aug. 25, 2016,
at C1 (reporting settlement of SEC case against former Fannie Mae CEO Daniel Mudd,
stating that "[t]he deal . . . requires essentially nothing of Mr. Mudd" with "the

government paying itself $100k to end the case"); see also Deutsche Bank Whistle-Blower
Spurns $8 Miion SEC Award, 48 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1660 (2016) (reporting that

8

whistleblower refused over $8 million bounty award because, while Deutsche Bank paid a
$55 million penalty, "top executives retired with their multi-million bonuses intact").
See U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ADDRESSING MISCONDUCT
THAT
LED
TO
OR
AROSE
FROM
THE
FINANCIAL
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml#keyStatistics.

9

CRISIS

(2016),

See Brandon Garrett, The Coporate Ciminal as a Scapegoat 101 VA. L. REv. 1789, 1790
(2015) ("The corporation appears to be a kind of a scapegoat: perhaps not entirely
blameless, as in the traditional concept, but literally impossible to actually jail--yet capable
of receiving the brunt of blame and punishment, while the individual culprits go free.");

Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-ProfitPubli Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REv. 853,
899 (2014) ("[D]efendants in government actions--as in private suits--may prefer to pay
financial awards if the alternative is to engage in lengthy remediation or submit to other
forms of injunctive relief. Even hefty financial penalties may amount to a proverbial slap
on the wrist for well-heeled defendants."). For a discussion of the rationale against
imposing large money penalties on public companies, see B. Seth McNew, Money Penalties

Against Pubicjl Held Companies:A ProposalforRestraint, 37 SEC. REG. L.J. 48 (2009); see also
Gretchen Morgenson, Making Them Pa (and Confess), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/business/at-the-sec-a-chance-to-get-tougher-on-
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misconduct remain in charge.1 0 In the fallout since, critics have called for the
pursuit of criminal penalties against Wall Street perpetrators." While some
have labeled widespread criminal prosecutions as impractical or too harsh,1 2 a
readily available civil enforcement remedy is at the SEC's disposal: the
initiation of enforcement actions against control persons of publicly-held
companies.13

The federal securities laws provide for control person liability pursuant to
Section 15 of the Securities Act 4 and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act.' 5 Under these provisions, a person who controls another who violates
the federal securities laws will be held jointly and severally liable for the
controlled person's acts, unless the control person establishes that he or she
acted in good faith and did not induce the underlying violation.1 6 Therefore,
control persons are subject to liability under these provisions even if they
themselves did not perpetrate the prohibited conduct. 7 While Section 15 of
the Securities Act focuses on control person liability in the private securities
litigation context, 8 Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act encompasses
control person liability in the private as well as the SEC enforcement setting. 9
Indeed, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Congress made clear that

to

it

settlements.html? r=0 (noting that most financial penalties are paid by shareholders or
corporate insurance carriers and are thus not much of a deterrent).
See sources cited supra note 9.
Eg., OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, RIGGED JUSTICE 2016: How WEAK
ENFORCEMENT LETS
CORPORATE OFFENDERS
OFF EASY
5-6
Jan. 2016),
http://www.warren.senate.gov/Eles/documents/Rigged Justice 2016.pdf
[hereinafter
WARREN REPORT].

12

13

14
15
16

.

17

E.g., Daniel C. Richman, Coporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 265 (2014)
(outlining in greater detail some of the legal impracticalities of bringing such criminal
prosecutions).
15 U.S.C. § 77o (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012). Unlike the U.S. Department of Justice,
the SEC has sole civil enforcement authority (with the exception of criminal contempt
proceedings).
15 U.S.C. 770.
15 U.S.C. 778t(a).
15 U.S.C. ( 77o; 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a); Maher v. Durango Metals, 144 F.3d 1302, 1305 n.7
(10th Cir. 1998) ("Although worded differently, the control person provisions of § 15 and
§ 20(a) are interpreted the same.").
15 U.S.C. § 77o; 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a); Maher, 144 F.3d at 1305 n.7; see also SEC v. Mgmt.
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1975) ("We find it plain, therefore, that the
'controlling person' provisions were enacted to expand, rather than restrict, the scope of
liability under the securities laws. Control was defined in a broad fashion . . . to reach
prospective wrongdoers . .
15 U.S.C. ( 770.
15 U.S.C. 78t(a).

18
19
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the SEC has the authority to utilize Section 20(a) in its enforcement actions, 20
embracing the majority view held by the lower federal courts. 21 Without
adequate explanation, however, the SEC has declined to invoke this attractive
enforcement tool against corporate executives who, as fiduciaries, oversaw
the misconduct of their respective companies.
In view of the SEC's tough rhetoric, 22 it is inexplicable why the SEC
declines to focus on this manifestly clear statutory remedy to address the
blatant misconduct that transpires.
This Article will examine the
Commission's refusal to pursue enforcement actions premised on control
person liability against corporate executives, directors, and other culpable
persons. It will seek to determine why the SEC has neglected to bring
enforcement actions based on control person liability against executives of
Wall Street's biggest miscreants.

20

21

22

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. Law No. 111203, § 929P(c), 124 Stat. 1865 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a): "Every person who,
directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of
any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is
liable (indudIg to the Commission in any action brought under paragraph (1) or (3) of section
78u(d) of this title), unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly
or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.")
(emphasis added); f 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (as amended Dec. 21, 2000).
See discussion infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text; see also SEC v. Hawk, No. 03:05CV-00172-LRH-VPC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57414, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2007) ("T]he
majority of courts have concluded that an SEC enforcement action can be brought
pursuant to Section 20(a)").
See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Securities
Enforcement
Forum
(Oct.
9,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539872100#_ftnref6
("[I]nvestors in our markets want to know that there is a strong cop on the beat - not just
someone sitting in the station house waiting for a call, but patrolling the streets and
checking on things.... I believe the SEC should strive to be that kind of cop - to be the
agency that covers the entire neighborhood and pursues every level of violation.").

11:2 (2017)
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II. AN OPEN DOOR FOR PURSUING GATEKEEPERS

23

Control is essential to the role of corporate executives as gatekeepers.
Within a business enterprise, gatekeepers may be defined as executives or at
times advisers whose functions encompass the effectuation of compliance
with the law by the subject enterprise. 24 Gatekeepers include CEOs, CFOs,
directors, compliance managers, lawyers, and auditors; depending on the
underlying circumstances, these individuals are in the position to influence, if
not control, the enterprise's conduct with respect to its compliance with the
law. 2 5 While the SEC recognizes that individual liability for gatekeepers is an

23

24

25

As discussed in the text, supra notes 14-21, Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933
imposes joint and several liability on any person who controls another person who is
liable under Sections 11 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77k) or 12 (15 U.S.C. § 771). That person
is liable "unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled
person is alleged to exist." Section 15 is irrelevant for purposes of this Article as Sections
11 and 12 are private claims which are not available for SEC enforcement actions.
Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1170-71 (2014) (discussing the role of gatekeepers
to detect and deter fraud); Kirschner v. KPMG, 938 N.E.2d 941, 962 (N.Y. 2010)
("Investors rely heavily on information prepared by or approved by auditors, accountants,
and other gatekeeping professionals") (citing United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465
U.S. 805 (1984)); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liabilyp Stratees and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 888-98 (1984) (addressing the role of gatekeepers); Andrew F.
Tuch, Mulkle Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1584 (2010) ("[]he liability of
professionals for the wrongs of their clients is premised on the ability of professionals to
monitor and control their clients' conduct."). In a more narrow sense, gatekeepers
traditionally have been confined to attorneys, accountants, and other professionals who
are "positioned to observe client conduct and prevent wrongdoing from taking place."
Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper-LiabilyO, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 53, 83 (2003). This Article uses the
term in a more expansive manner to include insiders whose position and obligations
within the subject enterprise encompass the effectuation of law compliance.
See Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) ("What is
difficult to understand is that with all the professional talent involved (both accounting
and legal), why at least one professional would not have blown the whistle to stop the
overreaching that took place in this case."); In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981) (focusing on legal counsel as
gatekeepers); Kara M. Stein, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Keynote Address at
Compliance Week 2014 (May 19, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/
Detail/Speech/1370541857558; sources cited supra note 24.
Note that, although
attorneys on occasion may be deemed control persons, this ordinarily is not the case.
Compare Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1986)
(attorney not a control person), with In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,939 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (allowing control person claim against
attorney to proceed). See generaly MARC I. STEINBERG, ATTORNEY LIABILITY AFTER
SARBANES-OXLEY § 2.07 (2015).
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effective way of promoting compliance with the law, 2 6 the Commission
steadfastly refuses to bring enforcement actions premised on control person
liability against individuals at large publicly-traded companies and investment
firms.
A. SEC's Authority to Pursue Control Persons
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act imposes liability upon any
person who controls another liable person to the same extent as such
controlled person, unless she can establish that she acted in good faith and
did not induce the violation. 27 In the brokerage firm setting, there is an
additional enforcement tool that may be used against "associated persons" of
a broker-dealer: Section 15(b)(6)(A) of the Exchange Act, which gives the
Commission power to institute administrative proceedings against an
associated person of a broker-dealer for his failure to reasonably supervise
another person who commits certain enumerated securities law violations. 28

27

28

See a/so Stein, supra note 25:
The Commission recently imposed a $200 million penalty against a large bank for
misstating financial results and lacking effective internal controls. This breakdown in
controls, a core part of compliance, contributed to billions - yes billions - in trading
losses. The penalty was unprecedented for this type of case and is one of the largest
penalties in the history of the Commission. Yet it amounted to a tiny fraction of the
firm's net income for just one quarter.
If our actions become nothing more than a footnote in the litigation reserve section of a
firm's financial statements, or a brief media storm that can be easily weathered before it is
back to business as usual, have we been effective?
Or is it more effective to hold individuals to account? The people who could have, and
should have, prevented the harm?
For SEC decisions, see, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1973)
(discussing the pivotal role of gatekeepers); Tirrell, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
78142, 2016 SEC LEXIS 2995 June 23, 2016) (liability premised on aider and abettor
liability against Merrill Lynch's former head of regulatory reporting); In re Fields, [1973
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 79,407 June 18, 1973), aff'd wthout opinion, 495
F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that, because of the SEC's limited resources, the
Commission relies on the diligence of professionals who practice before it).
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (providing that "[e]very
person who . . controls any person liable under any provision of this title . . shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any
person to whom such controlled person is liable . . . unless the controlling person acted in
good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the
violation or cause of action").
Sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
78o(b)(4)(E), (b)(6)(A). These provisions create personal liability in tandem, with Section
15(b)(4)(E) providing for liability against a broker-dealer who "has failed reasonably to

(

26
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Like the control person provision, the SEC generally has declined to invoke
this enforcement tool against supervisors of large brokerage firms in response
to misconduct that transpired, such as that which led to the financial crisis. 2 9
Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, the case law was
divided as to whether the SEC had the authority to bring a claim based on
control person liability, with the majority view holding that the SEC had such
authority.30 This confusion arose over disagreement as to whether the SEC is
a "person" under the Exchange Act.3 ' This inquiry was central as Section

29

30

31

supervise, with a view to preventing violations of the provisions of such statutes, rules,
and regulations, another person who commits such a violation, if such other person is
subject to his supervision." In turn Section 15(b)(6)(A) provides for liability against any
associated person who commits a violation of Section 15(b)(4)(E). For a more detailed
discussion of these provisions, see MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 958-68
(6th ed. 2013); Joseph A. Franco, Of Complidy and Complance: A Rules-BasedAnti-CompIi
StrateDgy UnderFederalSecuries Law, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1, 34-35 (2011).
Prior to the financial crisis, the major exception to this policy was the Commission's
enforcement proceeding in the Salomon Brothers proceeding. See Gutfreund, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-31554, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 85,067 (Dec. 3,
1992); Salomon Bros., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30721, [1991-1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,948 (May 20, 1992). The alleged discrepancy in
treatment between large and small firms has been addressed by numerous commentators.
See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the FinandalIndusty: Eidencefrom Enforcement Against
Broker-Dealers, 67 Bus. L. 679, 728 (2012) (stating that "when big firms and their staff were
engaged in misconduct, the SEC often brought actions based exclusively on corporate
liability, without naming any specific individuals as defendants").
See SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Since § 20(a) is
available as an enforcement mechanism to 'any person to whom such controlled person is
liable,' and the 1934 Act includes government agencies in the definition of 'person,' we
have upheld the SEC's authority to pursue an enforcement action under § 20(a)."); see also
SEC v. J.W. Barclay & Co., 442 F.3d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 2006) ("We join the Second Circuit
and hold that the SEC is a 'person' within the meaning of § 20(a)."); SEC v. Daifotis, No.
C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 4714250, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011) (finding that the
definition of person, as amended, "clarified a power that already existed under the
Exchange Act"); SEC v. Smith, No. C2-CV-04-739, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21427, at *28,
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2005) (finding the Sixth Circuit's holding in SEC v. Coffej denying §
20(a) liability in SEC enforcement actions, no longer valid in light of the congressional
amendment to the definition of "person," thus agreeing with the finding in First]ers).
But see SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Stringer, No. CV-011341-ST, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25523, at *39 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2003) (refusing to allow
the SEC to bring a claim under § 20(a) in an enforcement action).
See sources cited supra note 30. In 1974, the Sixth Circuit held that Section 20(a) did not
apply to SEC enforcement actions, because the SEC is not a person under the Act. Coffiy,
493 F.2d at 1318 ("As a matter of legislative interpretation, we hold that the SEC is not a
person under section 20(a), since section 20(a) was meant to specify the liability of
controlling persons to private persons suing to vindicate their interests."). Without
addressing the statutory wording, the Second Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in
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20(a) provided that a control person "shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom
such controlled person is liable." 32 Although case law had largely settled this
dispute, the Dodd-Frank Act provided language cementing the SEC's power
to pursue control persons by directly amending that section.33 Thus, as the
law stands today, the SEC clearly has the authority to invoke control person
liability against individuals within a subject enterprise.
B. The Meaning of Control
The term "control" is left undefined in the Exchange Act; however, the
SEC has construed the term to encompass "the possession, direct or indirect,
of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies

32

33

1975, finding the SEC to be within the statutory meaning of a person. See SEC v. Mgmt.
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 813 (2d Cir. 1975). This view was adopted by the Third
Circuit in Barcay, 442 F.3d at 842.
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
Id.:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of
this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable (incduding to the Commission in any acion brought underparagraph (1) or
(3) of section 78u(d) of this title), unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
(emphasis added); see also Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d):
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about to
engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this title [15 U.S.C.
§ 78(a) et seq.], the rules or regulations thereunder, the rules of a national securities
exchange or registered securities association of which such person is a member or a
person associated with a member, the rules of a registered clearing agency in which such
person is a participant, the rules of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, of
which such person is a registered public accounting firm or a person associated with such
a firm, or the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, it may in its discretion
bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, or the United States courts of any territory or other
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practices, and
upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be
granted without bond. The Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available
concerning such acts or practices as may constitute a violation of any provision of this
title [15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a) et seq.] or the rules or regulations thereunder to the Attorney
General, who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under
this title [15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a) et seq.].

11:2 (2017)
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of a person." 34 With regularity, courts have allowed control person claims in
private litigation to proceed against executive officers, including CEOs,
CFOs, and COOs. 3 5 Indeed, in a number of cases, courts have found that
outside directors may be control persons and thus subject to liability under
Section 15 of the Securities Act and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act. 36 Status as an outside director alone, however, may not be sufficient to
impose control person liability.3 7 Rather, some participation in the prohibited
conduct may be required.
For instance, in In re Proxima Corp., outside
directors were adequately pleaded to be control persons where
34

17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2014). The courts are generally in accord with this definition. See
Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1992) ("We have
looked to whether the alleged control-person actually participated in, that is, exercised
control over, the operations of the person in general and, then, to whether the alleged
control-person possessed the power or ability to control the specific transaction or activity
upon which the primary violation was predicated, whether or not that power was

exercised."); G.A. Thompson & Co., Inc. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 958 (5th Cir. 1981)
(finding that control was established when the defendant "had the requisite power to
directly or indirectly control or influence corporate policy").

35

See, e.g., In re Tronox, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d 202, 217-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (In
denying the officer-defendants' motion to dismiss claims under Section 20(a), the court
found that "[a] company acts through its officers, and plaintiffs have alleged sufficient
facts to support the inference that . . . [its] senior officers . . . effectuated the control
injected into the relationship between IMGG and Tronox . . . ."); Maverick Fund v.

Comverse Tech., 801 F. Supp. 2d 41, 51-52 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying a motion to
dismiss Section 20(a) claims brought against the Chief Financial Officer, General Counsel,
and several board members of the defendant corporations); Puskala v. Koss Corp., 799 F.

Supp. 2d 941, 956-58 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (The court denied the motion of the defendant
corporation's board member, Michael Koss, to dismiss the control person claim.
Although Koss argued that the court should dismiss the plaintiffs claim as proving that
he acted in good faith because the claim stated that he did not know of the behavior
constituting the primary violation, the court stated that Koss as "a controlling person can
be liable if he is reckless in failing to prevent the primary violation."); Metzger v. Am.

Food Mgmt., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (individuals who were secretarytreasurer and vice-president of company, and directors of that company, were found to be
controlling persons within the meaning of federal securities laws and were liable for
fraudulent sales of securities).

36

Salit v. Stanley Works, 802 F. Supp. 728, 734 (D. Conn. 1992) ("In light of the broad
construction given to the term 'controlling person,' directors are found necessarily to have
some 'indirect means of influence' over their corporation and the managers thereof. 'The
conclusion is inescapable that persons who act as directors are in control of the

37

corporation.'") (quoting Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969));
see also In re Wash. Mut., 259 F.R.D. 490 (W.D. Wash. 2009); In re Valujet, Inc., 984 F.
Supp. 1472, 1480 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Moerman v. Zippo, 302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y.
1969).
In re Proxima, Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 93-1139-IEG (LSP), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21443, at
*23 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 1994).

212

Virginia Law & Business Review

11:2 (2017)

[C]ertain outside directors had influential board and
committee positions, including membership on the Audit,
Finance and Compensation Committees, . . . had
considerable stock ownership; [and] . . . actively participated

in producing the false and misleading statements by, among
other things, assisting in the drafting and preparation of, or
endorsing or approving the Prospectus and Registration
Statement and various other public statements .... 38
In another case, plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the control element by
alleging that the outside director defendants were members of the board and
served on the company's finance and audit committees.39 There, the court
also focused on the fact that the corporation's SEC filings stated that its
board of directors was "actively engaged in formulating and overseeing
management's implementation of risk management policies."40
Control person liability may also be extended to lower level managers and
department heads if they exercised the requisite amount of control over the
primary violator(s).41 For example, in one case, the court allowed a control
person claim to proceed against the company's Vice President of Marketing
and Communications.4 2 The underlying primary violation in that litigation
arose out of the company's hiring of an outside promotion firm, which, as
alleged, fraudulently inflated the company's stock price through disguised
postings on online articles and blogs, using aliases such as "Stock Whisper"
38

39
40

41
42

Id. at *23-24 (citations omitted).
In re Wash. Mut., 259 F.R.D. at 509.
Id ("Plaintiffs successfully state a claim for control person liability against all Outside
Director Defendants by alleging that, in a 2008 SEC filing, WaMu stated that 'our entire
board are and have been actively engaged in formulating and overseeing management's
implementation of risk management policies.' Bare allegations of Outside Director status
are not sufficient to establish control person liability, but Plaintiffs' allegation goes beyond
this to affirmatively link board membership to WaMu's primary violations.").
See, e.g., In re Galena Biopharma, Inc. Sec. Litig., 117 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1199-1200 (D. Or.
2015).
Id. at 1168-69, 1201 (finding that a marketing director may be liable as a control person,
even when she did not possess the requisite scienter); see also Dutton v. D&K Healthcare
Res., No. 4:04CV147SNL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42553, at *58 (E.D. Mo. June 23, 2006)
(In considering a Section 20(a) claim against a middle manager, the court stated that "[t]he
control-person statute is 'remedial and is to be construed liberally. It has been interpreted
as requiring only some indirect means of discipline or influence short of actual direction
to hold a 'controlling person' liable."' However, the court ultimately dismissed the claim
against the manager as it found that he did not actually have control over the accounting
protocols, financial statements, public disclosures, or employees in charge of such items.).
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and "Wonderful Wizard." 43 The court, in denying the vice president's motion
to dismiss the Section 20(a) claim, found that she exercised significant control
over the primary violators.44 The court, however, did grant her motion to
dismiss the underlying securities fraud claim, reasoning that the allegations
were insufficient to support an inference of the level of scienter required in
order to be liable for that claim.4 5 This case illustrates that a relatively low

level executive may be liable as a control person even when she has not
committed the underlying violation.46
C. Establishment of the "Good Faith" Defense
Importantly, a defendant may avoid control person liability under Section
20(a) by showing that she acted in good faith and did not induce the
violation.4 7 With the good faith and non-inducement requirement as an
affirmative defense, the burden of proof thus falls on the control person to
establish this defense.4 8 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has made it clear
Ga/ena B/opharma, 117 F. Supp. 3d at 1158-60.

44

Id. at 1201 ("Bernarda was Galena's vice president of marketing and communications and
is responsible for Galena's investor and public relations; was involved in hiring
DreamTeam and other promotional firms; monitored DreamTeam's work; and reviewed,
edited, and approved the allegedly false and misleading articles. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
sufficiently allege that Bernarda had authority both over the management and policies of
Galena with respect to its investor and public relations and over the primary violations of
both the allegedly false and misleading articles and the alleged scheme.").
Id. at 1168-69 (dismissing the underlying § 10(b) claim as scienter was not adequately
shown).
Note that lower level employees who were not prosecuted for their participation in the
financial crisis often exhibited substantially more participation in the underlying fraud. See
discussion of Citigroup, infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012).
See Frank v. Dana Corp., 646 F.3d 954, 963 (6th Cir. 2011) (The lower court's dismissal of
a claim based on the fact that plaintiffs did not plead that the defendants failed to act in
good faith was overturned by the appellate court. There is no requirement that the
plaintiffs plead lack of good faith as an element of a Section 20(a) claim.); In re Stone
Webster, Inc. Sec. Litig., 424 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 2005) C'Based on the language of §
20(a), which treats the defendant's good faith as a part of the defendant's affirmative
defense, and makes no other reference to the defendant's state of mind, we noted that §
20(a) does not on its face require the plaintiff to prove any state of mind of the
defendant.") (citation omitted); Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881
(7th Cir. 1992) (The court noted that the statute provides for a defense of good faith,
where the burden rests on the defendant. When a defendant cannot conclusively show
that he acted in good faith, nor that he directly or indirectly induced the primary violation,
a determination of good faith is left to the factfinder to decide.); In re WorldCom, Inc.
Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4193, at *49 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.

45
46

47
48

&

43
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that "something more than negligence" is required in order to find a control
person liable. 49 The prevailing view is that a plaintiff need not show that a
control person participated in the fraud in order to establish liability, although
a minority of jurisdictions require a greater degree of misconduct.50

21, 2005) ("[O]n a motion for summary judgment 'it is not enough . .
to demonstrate
that plaintiffs fall short of producing evidence of culpable conduct; rather, the defendant
must put forth [his] own evidence of [the Section 20(a) good faith defense] sufficient to
direct a conclusion of law that [he] is entitled to the defense."' (quoting In re Boesky Sec.

49

Litig., No. 732, M21-45-MP, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10759, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1,
1995))).
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 209 n.28 (1976) ("Each of the provisions of
the 1934 Act that expressly create civil liability . . . contains a state-of-mind condition
requiring something more than negligence. . . . § 20, which imposes liability upon
'controlling person[s]' for violations of the Act by those they control, exculpates a
defendant who 'acted in good faith and did not . . . induce the act . . . constituting the

50

violation . . . .") (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78t).
See, e.g., Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 877 (8th Cir. 2010) ("federal control-person
liability is dependent on control, not fraud"); SEC v. Jackson, 908 F. Supp. 2d 834, 866
(S.D. Tex. 2013) ("[]he Fifth Circuit has made clear that, like the Eighth Circuit, it does
not require the plaintiff to show that the control person actually participated in the

primary violation."); Metge v. Baehler, 577 F. Supp. 810, 816 (S.D. Iowa 1984), affd in
pertinentpart, 762 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986) ("A plaintiffs
prima facie case under the Securities Exchange Act 20(a) (1934), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78t(a), does
not include proof of the controlling person's culpability. Culpability and good faith are
two sides of the same issue, and the burden of proving good faith is on the defendant. To
require the plaintiff also to prove culpability would amount to giving both parties the
burden of proof on the same issue. ... []he weight of authority is to the effect that the
plaintiff need not prove participation in the activity which gives rise to liability."); see also

Brian A. Melhus, Note, Control Person Liabikb: A Repudation of Cupable Partiqtation, 37
IOWA J. CORP. L. 929, 940 (2012). Some courts have required a plaintiff to show that a
controlling person's conduct, such as lack of supervision, "'was deliberate and done

intentionally to further the fraud."' Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 185 (3d
Cir. 1981) (quoting Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890 (3d Cir. 1975)); see
also Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 485 (3d. Cir. 2013) (While "culpable
participation 'may be premised on inaction [ ] . . . if it is apparent that the inaction
intentionally furthered the fraud or prevented its discovery.'... 'inaction alone cannot be a
basis for liability,' and a § 20(a) claim based on inaction fails if the controlling person 'had
no knowledge of [the controlled person's] fraudulent acts and dd not consdousjl intend to aid
the controlled person") (second emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting RocheZ Bros.,
527 F.2d at 890). Some courts have found that in alleging a Section 20(a) claim, a plaintiff
must "plead facts showing either conscious misbehavior or recklessness."
See In re

Vivendi Universal, S.A., 381 F. Supp. 2d 158, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Some jurisdictions

require that a plaintiff plead "culpable conduct," meaning that the plaintiff must "show
that the controlling person was in some meaningful sense a participant" in the securities
violations executed by the controlled person. See SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d

1450, 1472-73 (2d Cir. 1996) (In order to establish a prima facie case of controllingperson liability, a plaintiff must show a primary violation by the controlled person and
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D. Lack of Pleading Obstacles for the SEC
The SEC's reluctance to invoke the control person provision cannot be
explained by overly burdensome pleading requirements, as generally a low
pleading threshold applies to such claims.sI

For instance, the question of

whether an officer, director, or other insider is a control person is "a question
of fact which cannot ordinarily be resolved at the pleading stage." 52
While a respondent may assert a good faith defense against a control
person claim, a plaintiff is not required to plead bad faith in order to continue
the litigation.53 For example, one court reasoned that an assertion of good
faith is a defense under Section 20(a), thereby not requiring a plaintiff to
"anticipate and negate" an opponent's affirmative defense. 54 This fact alone
should make the control person liability provision an attractive enforcement
tool, as these claims are likely to survive a defendant's motion to dismiss.5 5

Given this, a good faith defense may not be adjudicated on its merits until the
summary judgment stage, except in those "relatively rare" circumstances in

s1

52

53

54

ss

control of the primary violator by the targeted defendant, and show that the controlling
person was '"in some meaningful sense [a] culpable participant[ ] in the fraud perpetrated
by [the] controlled person[ ],'. . . Control over a primary violator may be established by
showing that the defendant possessed 'the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities,
by contract, or otherwise."').
See In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1427, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
("Whether or not liability as a controlling person should be imposed cannot be otherwise
resolved at the pleading stage.").
In re Chambers Dev. Sec. Litig., 848 F. Supp. 602, 618 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
See Puskala v. Koss Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 941, 956 (E.D. Wis. 2011) ("[1]f the defendant
acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the primary securities
violation, he is not liable even if he is shown to have controlled the primary violator.
However . . good faith is an affirmative defense rather than an element of plaintiffs case.
Thus, to state a claim, a plaintiff need not plead facts that negate the good-faith defense.
Instead, once the plaintiff pleads the primary violation and that the defendant controlled
the primary violator, his job is done." (citation omitted)); Healey v. Chelsea Res. Ltd., 736
F. Supp. 488, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that the Second Circuit "requires that the
plaintiff allege and prove control, leaving it to the defendant to plead and prove good
faith and lack of participation"); Terra Res. I v. Burgin, 664 F. Supp. 82, 88 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("Plaintiffs need plead only that a defendant controlled a primary violator of the
securities laws. Any defense, such as the good faith defense here, must be raised in the
responsive pleadings.").
Terra Resources I, 664 F. Supp. at 88.
See Puskala, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 957 C'[P]laintiff is not required to plead facts negating the
good-faith defense. Instead, . . . plaintiff is entitled to gather additional facts during
discovery, and in doing so he may uncover information undercutting the good-faith
defense.").
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which "all facts necessary to the affirmative defense 'clearly appear[ ] on the
face of the complaint."' 5 6

Furthermore, due to the fact that proof of good faith is an affirmative
defense under Section 20(a), these claims do not require the SEC to adhere to
the heightened Rule 9(b) pleading standard under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.57 Rule 9(b) requires that "[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be
alleged generally." 58 Such specificity pertains only to the circumstances
constituting fraud, and does not apply to every element of a securities claim.59
Of course, when the underlying primary violation requires proof of
manipulative or deceptive conduct (such as Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act), 60 the control person claim cannot survive when fraud is
inadequately plead against the primary violator(s).61

56

57

58

s9

60
61

Goodman v. PraxAir, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original)
(emphasis omitted).
Teamsters Local 617 Pension & Welfare Funds v. Apollo Grp., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 959,
967-68 (D. Ariz. 2010) (a § 20(a) claim need not be pled in accordance with Rule 9(b) or
the PSLRA because scienter and fraud are not elements of such a claim); Siemers v. Wells
Fargo & Co., No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60858, at *40-41 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 14, 2006) C'The control exerted by [the defendant] is not a circumstance that
constitutes fraud. Plaintiff is only required to assert fraud with particularity as to primary
violations. At the control-person level, liability exists irrespective of the control person's
scienter"); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
("Pleading a Section 15 claim is also governed by Rule 8, and thus only requires an
allegation that the defendant controlled a person or entity that violated Section 11.").
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319
(2007) ("Rule 9(b) applies to 'all averments of fraud or mistake' (quoting Greenstone v.
Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992))).
See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 319; see also Marc I. Steinberg & Diego E. Gomez-Cornejo, BluMing
2
the Lines Between Plea&ng Doctrines: The Enhanced Rule 8(a)( ) Plausibilty Plea&ng Standard
Converges with the Herghtened FraudPlea&ng Standards Under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA, 30 REV.
LITIG. 1, 16-22 (2010).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). See general Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A
Reappraisalof SantaFe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federasm, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980).
See e.g., Brown v. Enstar Grp., Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396-97 (11th Cir. 1996); Malin v. IVAX
Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
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III. "CALLED THIRD STRIKES"-MAJOR SETTLEMENTS FOLLOWING
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FAIL TO INCLUDE CONTROL PERSON AND
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE LIABILITY

Due to the alleged misconduct culminating in the financial crisis, banks
and broker-dealers have paid billions of dollars in negotiated settlements with
the government. 62 While these institutions have been saddled with large sums
in penalties and disgorgement, there have been few individual actions, and
indeed only one such action approaches the scale of the corporate penalties
that have been levied. 63 The discussion below, by way of example, highlights
several of the major settlements and examines the underlying alleged
misconduct which led to the actions against these corporations. Notably, the
SEC complaints have focused on the lack of oversight and diligence by
persons who supposedly were controlling the subject corporation's conduct.
A. Bank of America and Merrill Lynch
The largest of these settlements, $16 billion, was entered into by Bank of
America. 64 According to the settlement's statement of facts, Bank of America
and its affiliate, Banc of America Mortgage Securities Inc. ("BOAMS'", 65
made numerous materially false representations in promoting the bank's
residential mortgage backed securities ("RMBS").66 Offering these securities
62

63
64

65

66

Matthew Goldstein, Goldman to Pa up to $5 Bilion to Settle Claims of Fault Mortgages, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/business/dealbook/
goldman-to-pay-5-billion-to-settle-claims-of-faulty-mortgages.html?_r=0.
See discussion of Settlement with Angelo Mozilo, infra notes 140-43 and accompanying
text.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofjustice, No. 14-884, Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion in
Historic Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading up to and During the

Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/August/14-ag884.html.
As Michael Lewis points out in his book The Big Short, "By early 2005 all the big Wall
Street investment banks were deep into the subprime game. Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch,
Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley all had what they termed 'shelves' for their subprime
wares, with strange names like HEAT and SAIL and GSAMP, that made it a bit more
difficult for the general audience to see that these subprime bonds were being
underwritten by Wall Street's biggest names." MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE
THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 24 (W.W. Norton & Company, Ltd ed., 1st ed. 2010).
Settlement Agreement Between the U.S. Dep't of Justice and Bank of America: Annex 1,
Statement
of
Facts
(Aug.
20,
2014),

https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/4312014829141220799708.pdf

(on file with

U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter D.O.J. Statement of Facts]. For the sake of clarity, this
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in a securitization trust known as BOAMS 2008-A, the bank represented that
these RMBS were backed by bank-oriented prime mortgages. 67 In fact,
however, the mortgages contained in the RMBS were known as "wholesale
mortgages," which are loans that originated from third-party mortgage
brokers; internal reports showed that these mortgages were decreasing in
performance and "were experiencing an increase in underwriting
exceptions." 68 This information regarding the quality of the underlying loans
was offered to a select few investors but was not disclosed to the investing
public or to the SEC.69
Moreover, Bank of America did not have third-party due diligence
conducted on the individual mortgages comprising the BOAMS 2008-A
offering.70 This was a substantial deviation from what the bank had done in
previous BOAMS offerings.'
Importantly, the due diligence that was
conducted for the allegedly fraudulent offering showed that several mortgages
contained in the BOAMS "did not conform to Bank of America underwriting
standards." 72 Allegedly, this lack of third-party due diligence represented an

67

settlement agreement included conduct committed by Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, as
both entities were later affiliates of Bank of America.
Id. at 1. For a discussion of mortgage backed securities and their role in the 2008 financial

crisis, see generally Janice Kay McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How Morgage-BackedSecurities,
Federal Deregulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a Wake-up Cal for Reforming Executve
Compensadon, 12 U. PA.J. Bus. L. 131, 131-36 (2009).
68

D.O.J. Statement of Facts, supra note 66, at 1.

69

Id.

70
71

Id. at 2.
Id. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that the lack of government oversight
contributed to a "crime-facilitative environment" that encouraged banks to commit
violations with little fear of repercussion. For instance, a sampling of fifty Bank of
America mortgages showed that sixteen (or nearly one-third) of the samples would have
required "suspicious activity reports" to be issued to the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network; however, no such report was issued by the Bank for any of the sampled
mortgages. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND

ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 161-62 (Jan. 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/

fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
72

D.O.J. Statement of Facts, supra note 66, at 2 C'Bank of America did not have third-party,
loan-level due diligence conducted on the specific mortgage loans collateralizing the
BOAMS 2008-A securitization. This was contrary to its past practice. Third-party, loan
level due diligence had been conducted on previous BOAMS securitizations that closed in
March, April, and August 2007; these diligence reviews revealed that some of the
mortgages reviewed did not conform to Bank of America underwriting standards. Thirdparty due diligence also had revealed data errors in the preliminary loan tapes that Bank of
America had provided to investors. Bank of America did not disclose in the BOAMS
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intentional change of course in order to cover up the lack of compliance with
the bank's own underwriting standards.73
Based on these facts, the SEC brought a complaint against Bank of

America claiming violations of Sections 5(b) (1),74 17(a) (2), and 17(a) (3)75 of
the Securities Act. 76
These sections are premised on non-fraudulent
misconduct. Section 5(b) (1) of the Securities Act is a strict liability provision
focused on registration mandates, which accordingly includes no mens rea
requirement] 7
Similarly, for violations of Sections 17(a) (2) and 17(a) (3),
based on materially misleading misrepresentations or other faulty disclosures,
the SEC need only show negligence.78 Conspicuously absent in the complaint
is any allegation based on fraudulent primary misconduct, control person
liability under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, or failure to supervise under

Sections 15(b)(4)(E)

73

74
75
76

77

78

and 15(b)(6)(A)

of the Exchange Act.

The SEC

2008-A offering documents that third-party, loan-level due diligence was not conducted
on the loans collateralizing BOAMS 2008-A.").
See Josef Ackermann, The Subprme Cr/is and Its Consequences, 4 J. FIN. STABILITY 329, 336
(2008) ("It is also undeniable that there is evidence that originators of US mortgagerelated securitisations [sic] displayed a lack of due diligence in assessing the risk of the
packaged mortgages . . . .").
15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)-(3).
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 45-46, SEC v. Bank of Am., N.A
(W.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 3:13-cv-447) [hereinafter Bank of America SEC Complaint].
See id. at 46 ("From at least November 2007, through at least January 2008, BAS and
BOAMS, directly or indirectly made use of means and instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit a prospectus
relating to a security with respect to which a registration statement had been filed without
ensuring that the prospectus met the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act.").
For a discussion of Section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act and the requirements of a
statutory prospectus, see MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW § 4.02
(LexisNexis ed., 6th ed. 2014).
See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) (stating that "the language of § 17(a) requires
scienter under § 17(a)(1), but not under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)"). Registration violations
such as a violation of Section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act and violations of Section
17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) may be brought in order to shield the defendant from the negative
stigma of fraud. SeeJames J. Park, Rules, Prnciles, and the Competion to Enforce the Secudies
Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 115, 140 (2012) ("An enforcer may also be wary of the moral
element of bringing a fraud case against a defendant. The open-ended nature of the fraud
prohibition is justified as a way of giving regulators the ability to target a wide array of
morally reprehensible conduct. But some enforcers may not want to enter the realm of
moral debate in pursuing principle-enforcement. It might be safer to bring lesser charges
of rule violations that can be characterized in technocratic terms."); Marc I. Steinberg,
SEC and Other Permanent Injunctons-Standards for Their Imposition, Moification, and
Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 27, 34-36 (1980) (discussing standards for imposition of
injunctive relief under Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3)).
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eventually settled its case against Bank of America.79 However, pursuant to
the settlement, the only provision of law Bank of America allegedly violated
was the SEC reporting mandates set forth in Section 13(a) of the Exchange
Act, a provision not requiring proof of scienter.80
The settlement's statement of facts also outlined the allegedly unlawful
conduct of Merrill Lynch in the time frame leading up to the crisis. 8' The
government alleged that through 2006 and 2007, Merrill Lynch marketed
seventy-two RMBS made up of "thousands of subprime mortgage loans." 82
While these offerings were being conducted, Merrill Lynch continued to
publicly represent that all of the mortgages contained in the securities
offerings "originated generally in accordance with the [originator's]
Underwriting Guidelines," and that the underlying loans conformed to
federal, state, and local law.83
Unlike Bank of America, Merrill Lynch had a third-party due diligence
provider rate the loans comprising the RMBS; these vendors rated the
underlying loans EV1-EV3, with EV1 being the highest. 8 4 Loans could be
given the lowest rating, EV3, when extended to borrowers who had recently
declared bankruptcy.85 Likewise, an EV3 rating was given where: the loan
was a "high cost" loan that appeared to violate state lending laws; debt-to79

so

81

82
83
84
85

See Bank of Am. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 72888, 2014 WL 4101590 (Aug. 21,
2014).
See id. at *1; see also SEC v. Floroserve Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 19154, 85 SEC
Docket 146 (D.D.C. 2005); cf Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697 (interpreting language of the
applicable statute to determine level of culpability required to be shown).
D.O.J. Statement of Facts, supra note 66, at 2. After a significant drop in value, Bank of
America purchased Merrill Lynch and its subsidiaries in 2008. See Matthew Karnitschnig,
Carrick Mollenkamp & Dan Fitzpatrick, Bank of America to Buy Mengi, WALL ST. J.; (Sept.
15, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122142278543033525. Following the merger,
Bank of America was sued for misleading shareholders about its purchase of Merrill
Lynch; this suit eventually led to a $2.43 billion private class action settlement. SeeJessica
Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, Bank of Amerca Settles Suit over Menv//for $2.43 Bi/ion,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/bank-ofamerica-to-pay-2-43-billion-to-settle-class-action-over-merrill-deal/? r=O.
The class
action complaint against Bank of America asserted Section 20(a) control person liability
against the Bank's CEO, CFO, and fifteen members of its board of directors, as well as
asserting such liability against Merrill Lynch's CEO. See Consolidated Amended Class
Action Complaint at 13-18, 106-17, In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA
Litig., No. 09-MDL-2058, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37799 (S.D.N.Y.
2010),
http://boasecuritieslitigation.com/pdflib/media_11.pdf.
D.O.J. Statement of Facts, supra note 66, at 2.
Id. (alteration in original).

Id. at 3.
Id at 2.
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income ratios did not comply with applicable product guidelines; there was
inadequate or missing documentation of income, assets, and credit history;
and stated incomes were determined to be unreasonable. 86 Amazingly, some
samples of Merrill Lynch RMBS were made up of over 50% EV3 rated
loans.87

While Merrill Lynch received and reviewed these reports, it made no
changes in its approval or marketing of RMBS. An internal email between
two employees is illustrative: "[h]ow much time do you want me to spend
looking at these [loans] if [the co-head of Merrill Lynch's RMBS business] is
going to keep them regardless of issues? . . . Makes you wonder why we have due
diligence performed other than making sure the loan closed."88 Furthermore,
Merrill Lynch began to learn in 2005-2006 that some of the lenders that
supplied the mortgages that would be part of its securitizations were relaxing
their lending and underwriting guidelines; 89 however, Merrill Lynch did not
disclose this information to investors or to the SEC.9o Merrill Lynch settled
claims based on alleged violations of Sections 5(b)(1), 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3)
without admitting or denying fault of any kind.91 Once again, there is no
mention in either the complaint or settlement documents of control person
liability under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, or failure to supervise
pursuant to Sections 15(b)(4) and 15(b) (6) (A).92
86

Id. (alteration in original). Such high cost loans included those that would violate state
predatory lending laws. It has been argued, however, that these laws were ineffective in
preventing foreclosure and otherwise predatory loans. See general Katherine M. Lehe,

Comment, Cracks in the Foundadon of FederalLaw: Amelioraing the Ongoing Morgage Foreclosure
Crisis Through BroaderPredatoULening Relef and Deterrence, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 2049 (2010).
87

D.O.J. Statement of Facts, supra note 66, at 3.

88

Id. (emphasis added).

89

Id. at 5. The "loosening" of the underwriters' guidelines resulted in an increase in the
amount of loans with unreasonable stated incomes being included in Merrill Lynch's
investment products. This was discovered by Merrill Lynch's due diligence manager, who
wrote two separate memorandums in 2005 and 2006 respectively, disclosing the problem
to the head of whole loan trading, yet the firm did not substantially alter its disclosures.

90

Id

91

See Final Judgment as to Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc. f/k/a Banc of Am.
Sec. LLC, SEC v. Bank of Am. et al., No. 3:13-cv-447, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169996, at
*1-2 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 25, 2014). None of these statutes require proof of knowing or
intentional misconduct.
See Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, SEC v. Bank of Am.; et al., No.
3:13CV00447, 2013 WL 4007352 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 29, 2014); cf Final Judgment as to
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc. f/k/a Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, SEC v. Bank of
America et al., No. 3:13-cv-447, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167627 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 25,
2014). It seems that the Commission may have another crack at Merrill Lynch, based on
its brokers' shady actions. The SEC recently probed the firm in regards to an investment

92

222

V/irginia Law & Business Review

11:2 (2017)

B. Citigroup
In August 2015, the SEC reached a settlement with Citigroup to pay $180
million for alleged violations of the securities laws arising out of pre-2008
conduct.93 The alleged violations occurred in connection with Citigroup's
conduct related to two hedge funds, ASTA/MAT and Falcon Strategies
("Falcon"). 94 According to the Commission, from 2002 to 2008, financial
advisors at these funds misrepresented the investment risks to clients; the
advisors touted the funds as "safe" or "low-risk" investments, even going so
far as to label them "bond substitutes."95 Financial advisors and the fund
manager continued to market the funds as low-risk investments, even when it
became apparent that the two funds were experiencing increased margin calls
and liquidity problems. 96 Of course, these funds were not as safe as they
appeared; both funds collapsed in 2008, leaving investors with billions of
dollars in total losses.97
In the settlement order, the SEC gives particularly scathing treatment to
the fund's manager, outlining his significant lapse in oversight.98 Interestingly,

93

that lost up to 95% of its value. Jean Eaglesham, SEC ProbesNotes Issued Bj MertI, WALL
ST. J., June 22, 2016, at C1. According to one anonymous Merrill financial adviser, the
fund was marketed in a way that was "borderline crooked." Id. This may well have been
a situation where Sections 15(b)(4)(E), 15(b)(6)(A), and 20(a) should have been invoked.
See Citigroup Alt. Invs. LLC & Citigroup Global Mkts. LLC, Securities Act Release No.
9893, Exchange Act Release No. 75710, Advisers Act Release No. 4174, 2015 SEC
LEXIS 3364, at *2 (Aug. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Citigroup Order].

9s

Id
Id.

96

Id.

97

Id. For further discussion of the cause of these funds' collapse, see Craig McCann, Whj
Cigroup Paid the SEC $180 Miion over MAT/ASTA, LINKEDIN (Aug. 19, 2015),
https://www.1inkedin.com/pulse/why-citigroup-paid-sec-180-milion-over-matasta-craigmccann.
Citigroup Order, supranote 93, at *4:

94

98

[T]he fund manager was involved in virtualy al fund-related communications with the finandal
advisers and investors. The fund manager and the fund manager's staff were responsible for
drafting and reviewing offering materials for the funds, crafting sales pitches to investors,
training CAI sales personnel (who, in turn, were responsible for marketing the funds to
the financial advisers), drafting quarterly investor reports, disclosing interim fund
performance, and managing the funds themselves. Furthermore, throughout the fund

offerings and fund operations, the fund man ger and the fund manager's staff at CAI met with
prospectve investors and responded airectly to inquiriesfrom the finandal advisers concerning the funds
without suffident overseght governing those oral communications. The fund manager and his staff at
CAI had significant influence over the dissemination of information relating to the funds
without review or oversight, including information relating to the funds' risks and
performance. CAI failed to implement a system in which the fund manager's authority
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in spite of this damning language, no fund manager or other executive is
named in the order.99 The Commission's lack of control person allegations
makes little sense, as it has successfully brought such claims against managers
of smaller funds for similar behavior. 00
In the Citigroup enforcement proceeding, the Commission invoked
Section 15(b) (4) (A) to impose censure and cease and desist proceedings
against the company based on its alleged violation of Sections 17(a)(2) and
17(a)(3).101 Although the Commission had the power to bring a claim for
failure to supervise under Sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6)(A), it declined to

99
1oo

101

was checked adequately or to ensure that the fund manager's communications with
investors and financial advisers concerning the ASTA/MAT and Falcon funds were
accurate and not misleading.
(emphasis added).
See Citigroup Order, supranote 93.
See, e.g SEC v. Quan, No. 11-723 ADM/JSM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131618, at *3-4 (D.
Minn. Sept. 19, 2014); SEC v. Lauer, No. 03-80612-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 73026, at *29-42, *88-90 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2008). For instance, in Quan,
Marlon Quan, while acting as manager and owner of two separate hedge funds, "met with
investors and distributed Preferred Placement Memoranda ('PPMs) and marketing
materials touting the risk management techniques that would be used to protect [his]
[f]unds' investments. [Such] promised safeguards included the use of a lock box account,
'full due diligence' on loan transactions, audits of 'intermediaries,' and the retention of
cash collateral in a blocked account." 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131618, at *3-4. More than
half of the hedge funds' capital was invested in loans to a company called PAC Funding.
Id. at *4. Unbeknownst to Quan, PAC was part of a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme
that had been operating for over a decade. Id. Quan was ultimately held personally liable
under both a Section 10(b) claim and a Section 20(a) control person claim. Id. at *27, *39.
Citigroup Order, supranote 93, at *7:
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act, Section 15(b)(4) of the
Exchange Act and Sections 203(e) and 203(k) of the Advisers Act, it is hereby
ORDERED that:
A. Respondents CAI and CGMI shall cease and desist from committing or causing any
violations and any future violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act.
Additionally, CGMI shall cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and
any future violations of Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act, and CAI shall cease and desist
from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Section 206(4) of
the Advisers Act and Rules 206(4)-7 and 206(4)-8 promulgated thereunder.
B. Respondents CAI and CGMI are censured.
C. Respondents shall, within ten days of the entry of this Order, pay disgorgement of
$139,950,239 and prejudgment interest of $39,612,089 to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to
SEC Rule of Practice 600.
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do so.1 02 Instead, it punted this powerful tool by refusing to invoke it against
the supervisors of the persons who committed the alleged violations.
C. Deutsche Bank
In May 2015, Deutsche Bank agreed to pay the SEC $55 million in
connection with allegations that the bank misrepresented the value of
derivatives leading to a material misstatement of its accounts.10 3 The SEC
alleged that the bank overvalued certain leveraged super senior trades
("LSS'", which led to a misstatement of the bank's financial statements in its
2008 Form 10-K and 2009 first quarter Form 10-Q.1 04 The resulting
misstatements were due to the fact that Deutsche Bank failed to adequately
measure the "gap risk" associated with such trades.105 According to the SEC,
"Deutsche Bank's deficient internal accounting controls contributed to
Deutsche Bank's failure to adequately assess the Gap Risk, resulting in the
102

103

104

105

Compare Section 15(b)(4)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(A) (2012)
(allowing for liability for a broker-dealer who "has willfully made or caused to be made in
any application for registration or report required to be filed with the Commission or with
any other appropriate regulatory agency . .. any statement which was at the time and in
the light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to
any material fact, or has omitted to state in any such application or report any material fact
which is required to be stated therein"), with Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (allowing for liability for a broker-dealer who "has failed reasonably
to supervise, with a view to preventing violations of the provisions of such statutes, rules,
and regulations, another person who commits such a violation, if such other person is
subject to his supervision").
See Ambereen Choudhury & Shane Strowmatt, Deutsche Bank to Pa $55 Miion to Settle
Derwatives Probe, BLOOMBERG (May 26, 2015, 10:13 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-05-26/deutsche-bank-to-pay-55-million-to-settle-sec-derivativesprobe.
See Deutsche Bank AG, Exchange Act Release No. 75040, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2145, at *23 (May 26, 2015) [hereinafter Deutsche Bank Order] ("The [Leveraged Super Senior]
trades at issue had a notional value of C$120 billion, or approximately $98 billion,
reflecting credit protection Deutsche Bank purchased from Canadian counterparties.
Initially, the trades were leveraged approximately eleven times which meant that the
Canadian counterparties posted collateral of approximately 9% of the notional value of
the trades or approximately $8.5 billion. Following a restructuring, finalized in early 2009,
the trades were partially deleveraged by the addition of collateral (bringing the collateral
total to $16.6 billion, plus additional margin funding from Deutsche Bank of
approximately $2.0 billion). The fact that the trades were leveraged created the risk that
Deutsche Bank's value of the full notional trade would exceed the value of the collateral
and thus expose Deutsche Bank to 'Gap Risk."').
See id. at *3-4. Gap risk is the risk that the price of an investment product will
significantly drop from one trade to the next.
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misstatement of its financial statements." 0 6 The alleged violations were
limited to reporting violations premised on Section 13(a) of the Exchange
Act, and Exchange Act Rules 13a-1, 07 13a-16,10 8 and 12b-20.109
The Deutsche Bank settlement drew the ire of Senator Elizabeth Warren
who took offense to the fact that the bank did not admit wrongdoing and that
no individuals were named.11 0 Indeed, in 2015, Deutsche Bank entered into
two major settlements with the federal government."' To some, including
Senator Warren, the settlement was a mere slap on the wrist. In fact, one
analyst said that the settlement "isn't relevant for Deutsche Bank."112
D. JP Morgan-Chase
Another recent settlement-which also angered Senator Warreninvolved a $307 million settlement between the SEC and banking giant JP
Morgan-Chase.11 3 The SEC alleged that JP Morgan wealth management

companies, JPMorgan-Chase

Bank, N.A.

("JPMCB")

and J.P. Morgan

Securities LLC ("JPMS"), failed to disclose conflicts of interests to its
investment clients.114
Specifically, JP Morgan financial advisors directed
clients, without adequate disclosures, to invest in funds that were owned by
JP Morgan, or funds where JP Morgan had a financial interest.115 This
conduct occurred consistently from 2008 to 2015.116

106

Id

107

Id. at *27; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2016) (requiring that subject issuer file an annual report).

108

Deutsche Bank Order, supra note 104, at *27; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-16 (2016) (requiring a
subject foreign issuer to file a Form 6-K report).

109

Deutsche Bank Order, supra note 104, at *27; 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2016) (requiring

110

that filings made with the SEC contain such additional material information as needed to
not make the report misleading).
WARREN REPORT, supranote 11, at 5-6.
Id. In November 2015 Deutsche Bank reached a settlement with the Department of
Justice for alleged violations of United States Sanctions Law. Liz Moyer, Deutsche Bank to

11

Pa $258 Miion and Fire 6 in Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/dealbook/deutsche-bank-to-pay-258112

million-and-fire-6-in-settlement.html.
Choudhury & Strowmatt, supra note 103 (quoting Kilian Maier, an analyst at Mainfrist

Schweiz AG in Zurich).
113

114

See WARREN REPORT, supranote 11, at 6.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Securities Act Release No. 9992, Exchange Act Release No.

76694, Advisers Act Release No. 4295, 2015 SEC LEXIS 5157, at *2-4 (Dec. 18. 2015)
115

[hereinafter
Id

116

Id.

J.P. Morgan

Order].
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While JP Morgan-Chase did admit fault in the settlement, the SEC
characterized the non-disclosures as a "negligent failure" and did not bring
any individual actions.117 However, the New York Times reported that several

JP

Morgan-Chase advisors revealed that "they were encouraged by their
superiors to put their clients into proprietary funds, even when lower cost or
better performing funds were available."11 8 Even though this conduct
evidently was facilitated by superiors, no executives were named and JP
Morgan was given a relatively light penalty."19
E. Goldman Sachs
One of the U.S. government's most recent settlements amounted to $5
billion, entered into by Goldman Sachs for its alleged misconduct in the

117

Id. at *2. J.P. Morgan's CEO, Jamie Dimon, has drawn the ire of several federal
regulators, including a feud with Senator Warren. See Kim Chipman, Jamie Dimon Says He's

Unsure If EZabeth Warren Understands Global Banking Sjstem,

"8

119

BLOOMBERG

(June 10, 2015,

2:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-10/dimon-says-unsure-ifwarren-understands-global-banking-system; Chris Matthews, The Ezabeth Warren v. Jamie
Dimon Feud Is Heating Up,
FORTUNE
(June
12,
2015,
1:55
PM),
http://fortune.com/2015/06/12/warren-dimon-feud/; Ben Rooney, Elzabeth Warren:
Whj Jamie Dimon Doesn't Like Me, CNN (June 12, 2015, 2:07 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/12/news/elizabeth-warren-amie-dimon/.
To critics,
one possible reason J.P. Morgan officials have avoided personal liability is because of that
enterprise's close relations with the federal government.
Senator Bernie Sanders
lambasted this closeness, particularly referring to Dimon, who is on the Board of
Directors of the New York Federal Reserve. In promoting his 2012 Federal Reserve
Reform Bill, Senator Sanders asserted that "[i]t is a blatant conflict of interest for Jamie
Dimon, the CEO and chairman of JPMorgan Chase, to serve on the New York Fed's
board of directors. . . . If this is not a clear example of the fox guarding the henhouse, I
don't know what is." Press Release, Office of Sen. Bernie Sanders, Bill Introduced to End
Conflicts
of
Interest
at
the
Federal
Reserve
(May
22,
2012),
http://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/bill-introduced-to-endconflicts-of-interest-at-the-federal-reserve.
Nathaniel Popper, ]PMorgan to Pa $307Milionfor Steering Clients to Own Funds, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/business/dealbook/jpmorganto-pay-307-million-for-steering-clients-to-own-funds.html.
See WARREN REPORT, supra note 11, at 6 (stating that the $307 million penalty represented
less than one percent of the bank's annual profits and may represent a month's worth of
profits for the assets-management division); Matt Robinson, ]PMorganAdmits It Didn' Tel
Clents About
Concts,
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
18,
2015,
11:37
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-18/jpmorgan-pays-267-million-tosettle-conflict-of-interest-claims.
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mortgage-backed securities market.1 20 The Department ofjustice's statement
of facts asserts that Goldman misled investors in its RMBS market about the
ways in which loans were securitized and the methods the bank would take to
protect investors.121 The bank touted its portfolio of mortgage loans as
"originated generally in accordance with the loan originator's underwriting
guidelines," ensuring investors that they were safe when in fact these loans
were tied to high-risk mortgages.1 22 Furthermore, the bank acknowledged
that it sold billions of dollars in high-risk mortgage bonds, while neglecting
(or refusing) to screen out questionable loans even though it represented to
investors that it undertook such a screening process.1 23
The settlement included $2.3 billion in federal penalties, another $875
million paid to state and other federal agencies, and $1.8 billion paid as
120

121

122

123

Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Goldman Sachs Agrees to Pay More than $5 Billion
in Connection with Its Sale of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (Apr. 11, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/goldman-sachs-agrees-pay-more-5-billion-connectionits-sale-residential-mortgage-backed.
Id. For a discussion of Goldman's role in the financial crisis, see Matt Taibi, The People v.
Goldman Sacks, ROLLING STONE (May 26, 2011), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/
news/the-people-vs-goldman-sachs-20110511 ("The bank seemed to count on the
unwillingness or inability of federal regulators to stop them and when called to
Washington last year to explain their behavior, Goldman executives brazenly misled
Congress, apparently confident that their perjury would carry no serious consequences.
Thus, while much of the Levin report describes past history, the Goldman section
describes an ongoing? crime - a powerful, well-connected firm, with the ear of the
president and the Treasury, that appears to have conquered the entire regulatory structure
and stands now on the precipice of officially getting away with one of the biggest financial
crimes in history.").
Settlement Agreement Between the U.S. Dep't of Justice and Goldman Sachs at 2 (Apr.
11, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/839901/download (on file with U.S. Dep't
ofJustice) [hereinafter Goldman Settlement]. The Department ofJustice concentrated on
this statement which was included in offering documents produced by Goldman Sachs
after January 2006:
Prior to acquiring any mortgage loans, [Goldman] will conduct a review of the related
mortgage loan seller. [Goldman's] review process consists of reviewing select financial
information for credit and risk assessment and underwriting guideline review, senior level
management discussion and background checks. The scope of the loan due diligence
review will depend on the credit quality of the mortgage loans. The underwriting
guideline review considers mortgage loan origination processes and systems. In addition,
such review considers corporate policy and procedures relating to HOEPA [Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act] and state and federal predatory lending,
origination practices by jurisdiction, historical loan level loss experience, quality control
practices, significant litigation and material investors.

Id.
See Aruna Viswanatha, New Details Disclosed in Goldman Morgage Pact, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12,
2016, at CL.
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consumer relief.1 2 4
Notably, and predictably, the settlement and
corresponding documents did not name any bank officials responsible for the
violations.125
Senator Elizabeth Warren called this settlement a "farce,"
criticizing the federal government for its refusal to hold executives
accountable for "Wall Street recklessness."1 26 In 2015, Goldman settled a
class action suit based on the allegedly materially false statements contained in
the offering documents.1 27 Unlike the government's suit, the private litigants
asserted control person liability claims against Goldman Sachs Mortgage's
CEO, Vice President, and one director.1 28

124

125

126

Goldman Settlement, supra note 122, at 3-4. While this seems like a hefty price to pay,
some commentators say that this is not enough, and remark that the bulk of the penalty
will not be felt by Goldman. See Susanna Kim, Goldman Sacks $5B Settlement May Not Be as
It Seems, ABC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2016, 4:10 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/
Business/goldman-sachs-5b-settlement/story?id=38332248 (Noting that half of the
penalty will be tax deductible. "'If that amount is tax deductible, and you apply the
corporate tax rate of 30 percent, they get to deduct almost a billion dollars,' Dennis
Kelleher, president and CEO of nonprofit Better Markets, told ABC News. 'If you read
the fine print, the agreement will allow Goldman Sachs to pay significantly less."').
See Viswanatha, supranote 123, at C1 ("[t]he pact . . mirrors past agreements other banks
have reached tied to the crisis and doesn't specifically name any allegedly culpable
employees or executives").
See U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren, FACEBOOK Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.facebook.
com/senatorelizabethwarren/posts/546470835515414 ("In the 2008 financial crisis, we
lost trillions in wealth and millions of people lost their homes and their jobs because of
Wall Street recklessness. Today, Goldman Sachs announced it will pay $5.1 billion for its
role in precipitating the economic collapse by misleading investors about the quality of the
junk mortgage securities they peddled. Sevenj ears later. No admission of guilt. No ina, /iduals

are going to jail. A pament that's barejl afraction of the bilons i, estors lost - and the trions our
economj lost - because of thisfraud. And over half ofit could be tax deductible! That's notjustice - it's
a white flag of surrender. It's time to end this farce. These companies think they're above the

127

128

law - and too many government officials go along with them. A first step would be to
pass the bipartisan Truth in Settlements Act to shine more light on these backroom deals.
A second step would be to get government officials who have the backbone to fight
back.") (emphasis added) (responding to a report of the settlement prior to its official
approval).
See Goldman Sacks Pais $272M to Settle Suit over Mortgage-Backed Securies, REUTERS (Aug. 13,
2015),
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/goldman-sachs-pays-272msettle-suit-over-mortgage-backed-securities-n409366.
Amended Complaint for Plaintiff at 87, NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v.
Goldman Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 11-2762-cv) (Control person
liability was asserted in this case under Section 15 of the Securities Act, as the primary
violations were alleged under the private causes of action found in Section 11 of that Act.
The complaint did not assert a claim based on Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, as the
only other violation alleged was premised on Section 11 of the Securities Act.).
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F. FCIC Investigation
Misconduct, such as that exhibited by the foregoing examples, was all too
common during the buildup to the financial crisis.
An investigation
conducted by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission ("FCIC")129 asserted
that "[t]he captains of finance and the public stewards of our financial system
ignored warnings and failed to question, understand, and manage evolving
risks within a system essential to the well-being of the American public."

30

For instance, the FCIC found that Countrywide executives recognized that
many of the loans they were originating could lead to massive default and
significant damage to the firm and its investors; however, they refused to stop
approving these mortgages.131
Likewise, the FCIC found that AIG
management was ignorant regarding the terms and risks of the company's $79
billion derivatives exposure with respect to mortgage-related securities.1 32
Clearly, the crisis was brought about, in significant part, by a lack of
oversight by the executives and board members tasked with monitoring these
corporations' operations. Control person and failure to supervise claims
could have been instituted against specified directors, high level officers, and
other executives; however, all these individuals avoided sanctions pursuant to
the above settlements.'13

129

130
131
132
133

The ECIC was established through the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. It
is a ten-person panel made up of private citizens with experience in housing, economics,
finance, market regulation, banking and consumer protection. The ECIC was given
statutory instruction to investigate twenty-two different topics, or "factors," which
Congress believed contributed to the financial collapse. These factors included fraud and
abuse in the financial sector, the quality of due diligence by financial institutions, and
corporate governance.
Histor of the Commission, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N,
https://fcic.law.stanford.edu/about/history (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
ECIC REPORT, supranote 71, at 6.
Id. at xxii.
Id. at xix.
For a discussion of control person liability against lower level employers, see supra notes
41-46 and accompanying text.
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LIMITED USE OF CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY

'The SEC doesn't alays use all of the penalties at its disposal, and it
should."134

Senator Chuck Grassley, July 9, 2015
Although the SEC clearly has the power to bring actions premised on
control person and failure to supervise liability, these actions, when instituted
at all, have frequently been brought against top level personnel of relatively
small enterprises, not the "big fish" associated with the financial crisis and
misconduct perpetrated thereafter. 35 This inaction has precipitated a call for
an increase in prosecution of individuals responsible for corporate
misconduct.1 36 Indeed, the SEC has made lofty statements in the past
regarding the pursuit of corporate individuals. Consider the following speech
given by SEC Chair Mary Jo White in 2013:
Another core principle of any strong enforcement program
is to pursue responsible individuals wherever possible. That
is something our enforcement division has always done and
will continue to do. Companies, after all, act through their
people. And when we can identify those people, settling
only with the company may not be sufficient. Redress for
wrongdoing must never be seen as "a cost of doing
business" made good by cutting a corporate check.' 37
134

135

136

137

Press Release, Office of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Bill Seeks Tougher Penalties for Wall Street
Fraud (July 9, 2015), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/bill-seekstougher-penalties-wall-street-fraud.
See, e.g., Leonard Weiser-Varon, SEC Introduces "Control Person" Dabily as Enforcement
Action Weaon in Claim Against Municjpa Officer for Misleaing Bond Offering Document,
MARTINDALE.COM
(Nov.
17,
2014),
http://www.martindale.com/financelaw/articleMintz-Levin-Cohn-Ferris-Glovsky-Popeo-PC_2183274.htm
(regarding
a
$10,000 penalty imposed on a former mayor of Allen Park, Michigan for misleading bond
offerings).
See WARREN REPORT, supra note 11; see also Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates,
Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All U.S. Att'ys et al., (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter Yates Memo] (calling for
an increase in DOJ prosecution of individuals).
Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech at the Council of Institutional
Investors Fall Conference in Chicago, IL: Deploying the Full Enforcement Arsenal (Sept.
26,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539841202
("Individuals tempted to commit wrongdoing must understand that they risk it all if they
do not play by the rules. When people fear for their own reputations, careers or
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This statement, however, at least with respect to the "big players,"
appears to be an empty mandate-mere "jawboning."
A. Actions Against Executives
Actions against executives and other insiders are more common than
those against outside directors;1 38 however, the SEC regularly declines to
invoke control person liability.' 39 In one of the largest individual settlements
in the wake of the financial crisis, the SEC reached an agreement with former
Countrywide CEO, Angelo Mozilo. Among the sanctions levied, Mozilo paid
$22.5 million in penalties and an additional $45 million in disgorgement.1 40

138

139

140

pocketbooks, they tend to stay in line. Of course, there will be cases in which it is not
possible to charge an individual. But I have made it clear that the staff should look hard
to see whether a case against individuals can be brought.").
See, e.g., SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (reinstating jury verdicts finding
corporate officers engaged in securities fraud with respect to improper revenue
recognition and earnings manipulation); SEC v. May, 648 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2009);
SEC v. Bernard Cole, William Hennessy, Douglas Hodge & Robert Steimle, Exchange
Act Release No. 3049, SEC Litigation Release No. 21207, 2009 WL 2915645 (N.D. Ohio
2009); ArtbroCare to Paj $30M in DPA overAlleged $400M Reenue Scam, 46 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 96 Jan. 13, 2014); MassMutual to Paj $1.625M oer Disclosures About Annuip
Product, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2111 (Nov. 19, 2012): PW India Affilates to Paj
Record $6M; Sapam Settles Suit Over $1B FinandalScam, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 807
(Apr. 11, 2011); Buffet's Gen Re Settles DOJ, SEC Charges Related to AIG, PrudentialAccounting
Fraud, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 160 Jan. 25, 2010); Greenber, FormerAIG Top Exec.,
Agrees to Paj $15M to Settle Accouning Claims, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1503 (Aug. 10,
2009); GM Settles SEC Charges It Misstated Accoundng Activides in Fiings, 41 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 139 Jan. 26, 2009); Former Oil Giant, Execs Settle Fraud Charges over Reserves
Reporing 40 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1140 July 21, 2008).
See Complaint, SEC v. Gibson, No. 1:15-CV-00363-UNA (D. Del. May 6, 2015) (The
SEC filed aiding and abetting charges against four officers of Wilmington Trust for
omitting from their public disclosures the balances of certain matured loans which in
turned masked the potential for deterioration in the trust's loan portfolio. No control
person charges were alleged.); Miller Energy Res., Exchange Act Release No. 75622, 2015
SEC LEXIS 3186 (Aug. 6, 2015) (charging the company's former CFO and COO with
inflating valuations of oil and gas properties, which in turn resulted in fraudulent financial
reports. The charges were based in large part on the CFO's failure to follow GAAP when
valuing assets, thus resulting in the overstatement. Control person liability was not alleged
in the order.).
Final Judgment as to Defendant Angelo Mozilo, SEC v. Mozilo, No. CV 09-3994-JFW
(MANx), 2010 WL 3656068 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010) (holding that, in addition to fines
and disgorgement, Mozilo was permanently barred from serving as an officer or director
of a publicly-traded company); see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Former
Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to Pay SEC's Largest-Ever Financial Penalty Against a
Public
Company's
Senior
Executive
(Oct.
15,
2010),
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The SEC alleged that Mozilo assured the public that Countrywide was a
prime mortgage lender, while in fact, the firm continued to write risky loans
and packaged these loans in its mortgage-backed securities.141
In its
complaint, the SEC alleged violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act,142
Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act,14 3 and fraud under Section 10(b).144 The
complaint did not, however, include a control person allegation.
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
finding of liability against a former Chief Accounting Officer for engaging in
accounting improprieties and acting recklessly in regard to certain
transactions.1 45 The defendant argued that he "relied on experienced
subordinates to advise him on the transactions, vetted the transactions with
the firm's outside auditors, and made an independent assessment of the facts
before him in approving the accounting treatment for these transactions."146
The court, however, upheld his liability for securities fraud under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, finding that his "willful blindness" constituted
recklessness, and thus he possessed the requisite scienter for securities

141

142

143
144

145
146

https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-197.htm (Robert Khuzami, then Director
of SEC Enforcement, stated that "Mozilo's record penalty is the fitting outcome for a
corporate executive who deliberately disregarded his duties to investors by concealing
what he saw from inside the executive suite - a looming disaster in which Countrywide
was buckling under the weight of increasing risky mortgage underwriting, mounting
defaults and delinquencies, and a deteriorating business model.").
See sources cited supra note 140.
Complaint at 47, SEC v. Mozilo, No. CV 09-3994-JFW (MANx), 2010 WL 3656068 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 16, 2010). Section 17(a)(1) makes it unlawful, in connection with the sale of
securities, to employ any device, artifice, or scheme to defraud; Section 17(a)(2) makes it
illegal to obtain money or property by use of untrue statement of material fact or any
omission of a material fact; and Section 17(a)(3) is violated when one engages in any
transaction that would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(2012). Scienter is required to be proven for a violation of Section 17(a)(1), while
negligence suffices for Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3). Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695700 (1980).
Complaint, supra note 142, at 49. For a discussion of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act,
see supranote 80 and accompanying text.
Complaint, supra note 142, at 48. Section 10(b) and the rules promulgated thereunder
make it unlawful to employ any deceptive or manipulative device "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). While the private right of
action may be applied only to primary violators, the SEC is entitled to bring an
enforcement action premised on this section against aiders and abettors. See, e.g., Section
20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e); SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204 (2d
Cir. 2012); SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553 (2d. Cir. 2009).
See SEC v. Delphi Corp., No. 11-2624, 2012 WL 6600324 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id at *8-9.
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fraud.1 47 Although here recklessness was enough to get the SEC past the
scienter bar, it could have pursued the chief accounting officer under the
control person provision, yet declined to do so.
As illustrated by these examples, it is clear that in the "big player" setting,
the SEC has declined to invoke control person liability even when it brings an
enforcement action against an individual.1 48 This refusal to do so, as
discussed above, cannot be due to unfavorable law. Rather, the SEC must
have some other reason for its unwillingness to hold control persons liablenamely, it may be posited that the SEC is taking a purposely weak approach
in prosecuting "big fish" individual violators in "blue chip" publicly-held or
regulated enterprises, such as Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and Citigroup.
The Commission can wax poetically about the importance of corporate
gatekeepers;1 49 nonetheless, the SEC allows these "players" to exit the
backdoor when the government comes knocking.
B. Actions Against Directors
One area where the SEC has been particularly timid is in the pursuit of
directors. Indeed, as observed by a former SEC Commissioner, "these
matters are so infrequent that the agency does not currently maintain statistics

147

148

149

Id ("Free argues that in finding that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's
finding that he acted with scienter, the district court cited documents that he did not see
or did not know about and improperly concluded that attacks on his credibility could
substitute for a culpable state of mind. On de novo review, however, we find that the
record contains sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdicts. First, we find that there
was sufficient evidence that Free acted recklessly or turned a blind eye to the fact that the
Bank One Transaction lacked economic substance as a sale.. .. Second, we find that there
were a number of red flags indicating that the EDS Transaction was not a true rebate that
Free ignored.").
This idea is not new; the SEC is frequently criticized for attacking smaller issuers, while
allowing the "big players" to escape with little repercussion. See generaly Jeffrey H.
Rasansky & Helen L. Miller, A Slap on the Wrist or a Punch in the Face: The SEC's
DisproportionateTreatment of NYSE Member and Non-NYSE Member Firms, 19 SEC. REG. L.J.
243 (1991).
Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement to The Twentieth Annual
Stanford Director's College: A Few Things Directors Should Know About the SEC (June
23, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542148863 ("Those
of you who are directors play a critically important role in overseeing what your company
is doing, and by preventing, detecting, and stopping violations of the federal securities
laws at your companies, and responding to any problems that do occur. In other words,
jou are the essental gatekeepers upon whom your investors and, frankly, the SEC rely.")
(emphasis added).
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on cases that are brought against directors." 50 Generally, actions against
directors are brought only when their conduct is particularly egregious.15
This is true even though failure by board members and other gatekeepers is a
"common denominator in many of the major frauds."1 52 The SEC's most
recent action against a public company director involved Stephen Pence,
Chairman of the Board of Directors for General Employment Enterprises, a
publicly-traded company.153 Pence was the majority shareholder of the
company; however, in reality, he was acting as agent for Wilber Huff, a
convicted felon who sought to take over a controlling interest in the company
for the purpose of acquiring and rolling into one public entity several private
companies which Huff himself owned.154 The SEC brought claims under
Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Rule 13b2-2.155 While this case may represent
the extreme, it showcases the SEC's unwillingness to touch directors unless
their conduct rises to an egregious level.
While actions against directors are uncommon, a number of these cases
involved failures in oversight by audit committee members.156 For instance,
150

151

Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the 12th Annual
Boardroom Summit and Peer Exchange: The Important Work of Boards of Directors
(Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/important-work-of-boards-ofdirectors.html.
See Matteo Tonello, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Outside Directors Offer Reminder for
Boards, HARV.

152
153

154
155

156

L. SCH.

F.

ON CORP.

GOVERNANCE

& FIN. REG.

(July 16, 2011),

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/07/16/sec-enforcement-actions-against-outsidedirectors-offer-reminder-for-boards/.
SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963(JSR), 2003 WL 22004827, at *17 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 26, 2003).
See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges BDO and Five Partners in
Connection with False and Misleading Audit Opinions
(Sept. 9, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-184.html; see also, Bradley Bondi, A Brief
Histoy of SEC Enforcement Actions Against Directors, LAW360 (Oct. 16, 2015, 1:59 PM),
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/714967/a-brief-history-of-sec-enforcement-actionsagainst-directors.
Press Release, supranote 153; Bondi, supranote 153.
See Complaint at 4, SEC v. Pence, No. 1:15-cv-07077, 2015 WL 5244668 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
9, 2015) (related to false representations and conduct in connection with the preparation
of required reports and documents).
See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 39157, [1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 85,963, T 89,897 (Sept. 30, 1997) ("The Commission is issuing
this Report of Investigation to emphasize the affirmative responsibilities of corporate
officers and directors to ensure that the shareholders whom they serve receive accurate
and complete disclosure of information required by the proxy solicitation and periodic
reporting provisions of the federal securities laws. Officers and directors who review,
approve, or sign their company's proxy statements or periodic reports must take steps to
ensure the accuracy and completeness of the statements contained therein, especially as
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the Commission filed a complaint against outside directors of the publiclytraded company DHB Industries. 57 The complaint alleged that three of the
company's independent directors engaged in misconduct through their
"willful[] blind[ness] to red flags signaling accounting fraud." 58 Their actions
allowed the corporation's management to file materially false and misleading
documents with the SEC and use business proceeds for personal expenses.159
In its complaint, the SEC charged seven counts, including violations of
Sections 10(b), 13, and 14 of the Exchange Act.1 60 Conspicuously absent,
however, was a control person claim under Section 20(a). This is particularly
notable considering the SEC brought an aiding and abetting claim under
Section 10(b), a claim which requires proof of substantial assistance and
knowing or reckless misconduct."161
The fact scenario made a Section 20(a) claim available against the outside
directors.1 62 Crantz, Chasin, and Nadelman were members of the audit
committee; nonetheless, they allowed the company's CEO to run the external
investigation involving allegations that focused on his own personal
spending.1 63 Moreover, Nadelman signed a fraudulent document, which was
backdated in order to explain the CEO's lavish spending.1 64 Given these

157

158

159
160
161
162
163
164

they concern those matters within their particular knowledge or expertise. To fulfill this
responsibility, officers and directors must be vigilant in exercising their authority
throughout the disclosure process."); see also Bill Baker et al., Liabilo of Outside Directors in
SEC Enforcement Actions, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, May-June 2011, at 16; Bondi,
supranote 153; Tonello, supranote 151.
See SEC v. DHB Indus., Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 21,867, 2011 WL 700536 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 28, 2011) ("The complaint against Krantz, Chasin, and Nadelman further alleges
that their willful blindness to red flags enabled DHB's former chief executive officer,
David Brooks, to divert at least $10 million out of the company through fraudulent
transactions with a related entity he controlled. By ignoring the numerous red flags, the
three outside directors also facilitated DHB's improper payment of millions of dollars in
personal expenses for Brooks. These expenses included such items as luxury cars, jewelry,
art, real estate, extravagant vacations, and prostitution services. As a result of this
misconduct, DHB's SEC filings and press releases contained materially false and
misleading financial and other information. Despite being confronted with numerous,
significant, and compounding red flags indicating fraud, Krantz, Chasin, and Nadelman
approved and/or signed DHB's false and misleading filings.").
Complaint at 1-2, SEC v. Krantz, No. 11CV60432, 2011 WL 12907486 (S.D. Fla. Feb.
28, 2011).
Id.; see also Tonello, supranote 151.
Complaint, supranote 158, at 2-3.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012); SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 211-16 (2d Cir. 2012).
See discussion of liability of outside directors, supranotes 150-61 and accompanying text.
Complaint, supranote 158, at 31.
Id at 28.
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allegations, the named board members apparently exercised sufficient control
over the primary violator to bring them within Section 20(a); however, the
SEC did not bring a claim under this provision.165
For decades, the SEC has been willing to bring actions premised on
failure to supervise against officers and directors of smaller broker-dealers.1 66
On only rare occasions, however, has the SEC brought such actions against
the "big players." For example, over two decades ago, the Commission
invoked its authority under Sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6)(A) to issue civil
penalties and officer and director bars against Salomon Brothers' CEO,
President, and Vice President.1 67 These charges were based on their failure to
supervise a Salomon Brothers' employee who had submitted a false bid of
$3.15 billion in an auction of U.S. Treasury securities.1 68 Although the
defendants told the Chief Legal Officer that they would report the improper
act, they neither timely did so nor did they investigate the matter.1 69 The SEC
stated: "[t]he respondents are not being charged with any participation in the
underlying violations.

. .

. [T]he Commission believes that the Respondents'

supervision was deficient and this failure was compounded by the delay in
reporting the matter to the government."1 70
As discussed, actions against directors certainly are not the norm for the
SEC, and when they do happen, they usually involve smaller publicly-traded
companies as opposed to executives and directors at the big banks and
brokerage firms allegedly responsible for the financial collapse.171 Meanwhile,

168

See discussion of liability of outside directors, supranotes 150-61 and accompanying text.
See Gadinis, supra note 29; Rasansky & Miller, supra note 148.
Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31554, 1992 WL 362753, at *11 (Dec. 3, 1992).
Gutfreund, the Chairman of the Board and CEO, was ordered to pay a $100,000 fine and
received a permanent officer and director bar. Thomas Strauss, the firm's President, was
prohibited from associating with any broker-dealer for a period of six months and was
ordered to pay $75,000 in civil penalties. Vice PresidentJohn Meriweather was suspended
from associating with any broker-dealer for three months and was required to pay a
$50,000 penalty. Id. at *16-17.
Id. at *2.

169

Id.

170

Id. In a controversial proceeding, the SEC brought failure to supervise charges against the
general counsel of the broker-dealer firm Ferris Baker Watts. The charges against the
general counsel subsequently were dismissed. See also Urban, Exchange Act Release No.
66259, 2012 WL 1024025, at *1 Jan. 26, 2012). One of the authors of this Article, Marc
I. Steinberg, served as an expert witness in this matter and testified on behalf of Mr.
Urban.
See Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC to Examine Boards' Role in FinandalCrisis, WASH. POST (Feb.
20, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/19/AR
2009021903172.html; Glenn Greenwald, The Real Story of How 'Untouchable' Wal Street

165
166
167

171
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the Commission purports to be holding "gatekeepers" accountable, even
suggesting that such stringent responsibility may make director roles
unattractive.1 72 In reality, however, the Commission has the perfect tool,
Section 20(a), to aggressively pursue these directors, as well as Section
15(b)(6)(A) in the brokerage firm setting. Yet, it declines to use these
provisions, generally only bringing primary or aiding and abetting claims when
there is blatant misconduct engaged in by these fiduciaries.1 73
V. POSSIBLE RATIONALE FOR LACK OF CONTROL PERSON ACTIONS

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is particularyfeeble,
oftenfaiing to use thefull range of its enforcement toolbox.174
Senator Elizabeth Warren, January 2016
In many proceedings, the SEC declines to bring control person claims
because they are unnecessary in order to procure the desired relief. Consider
the action against Stephen Pence.17 5 Pence was essentially acting as a sham
controller so that Wilber Huff could operate a self-serving scam behind the
scenes. Taking the allegations as true, the SEC successfully instituted claims
under Section 10(b) for fraud and for reporting violations under Section 13 of
the Exchange Act.1 76
Does the SEC's non-use of the control person provision signify that this
provision is unnecessary or that the misconduct at issue is otherwise being

172

173
174
175
176

Execs Avoided Prosecution, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 23, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/why-wall-street-execs-werent-prosecuted-2013-1.
For
discussion of the lack of director turnover following the financial crisis, see Steven M.
Davidoff, Andrew C.W. Lund & Robert Schlonau, Do Outside DirectorsFace Labor Market
Consequences? A Natural Exementfrom the FinandalCrsis, 4 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 53 (2014).
Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Securities Enforcement
Forum
(Oct.
9,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539872100#_ftnref6
("It has
been suggested that our focus on gatekeepers may drive away those who would otherwise
serve in these roles, for fear of being second-guessed or blamed for every issue that arises.
I hear and I am sensitive to that concern. But this is my response: first, being a director
or in any similar role where you owe a fiduciary duty is not for the uninitiated or the faint
of heart. And, second, we will not be looking to charge a gatekeeper that did her job by
asking the hard questions, demanding answers, looking for red flags and raising her
hand.").
See, e.g., Complaint, supranote 158, at 24.
WARREN REPORT, supranote 11, at 1.
See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
See Complaint, supranote 155, at 31-32.
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addressed? Absolutely not. Instead, settlements such as this one show that
the SEC may pursue those insiders who are viewed as primary violators or
aiders and abettors. Surprisingly, the Commission declines to invoke Section
20(a) as an effective resource to fill in the gap between primary violators and
culpable directors, officers, supervisors, managers, and other executives who
allow securities violations to happen, but who cannot themselves be held
liable as aiders and abettors (either due to the lack of the requisite heightened
mens rea or inability to prove the substantial assistance element). Section
20(a)-as well as Section 15(b)(6)(A) in the brokerage firm setting-can be
used in instances where a responsible control person or supervisor has not
engaged in a primary violation or acted as an aider or abettor, but nonetheless
should still be held responsible for his or her failure of oversight. This is
consistent with the thrust of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts,
which aimed to enhance corporate governance by seeking to incentivize
directors, executive officers, and other gatekeepers to be more accountable to
shareholders and the securities markets.1 77
A. General Unwillingness to Enforce Stronger Liability Against
Control Persons
The SEC's laxity in bringing control person claims is made clearer when
compared to the amount of private litigation alleging liability under Section
20(a). Indeed, within the last three years, cases have been filed in every single
U.S. circuit alleging Section 20(a) control person liability.' 78 These claims are

Protectin~g Shareholdersand Enhandng Puble Confidence bj Improving Coporate Governance: Heany
Before the Subcomm. on Sec., ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs,
111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jack Reed, Chairman, Subcomm. on Sec., Ins.,
Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs) ("Wall Street executives who
pursued reckless products and activities they did not understand brought our financial
system to this crisis. Many of the boards that were supposed to look out for shareholders'
interests failed at this most basic of jobs.").
See, e.g., Sachsenberg v. IRSA, No. 2:16-cv-02213-PD (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2016); Breton v.
Alere, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-10834-PBS (D. Mass. May 4, 2016); Benson v. Santander
Consumer USA Holdings Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00919-C (N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2016); Oswald v.
Skullcandy, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00246-CW (D. Utah Mar. 28, 2016); Broadway Gate Master
Fund v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 9:16-cv-80056-RLR (S.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2016); Gibrall v.
Intrexon Corp., No. 3:16-cv-02457-RS (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2015); Hays v. Babiak, No. 1:14cv-09786 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2014); Klein v. T.D. Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 8:14-cv00396 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2014); Burgess v. Bancorp S., No. 3:14-cv-01564 (M.D. Tenn. July
31, 2014); In reJ.P. Morgan Chase & Co, No. 1:12-cv-03852-GBD (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15,
2013).
&
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commonly asserted side by side with primary violations in private securities
class actions,' 79 yet the SEC has not caught on.
The SEC's refusal to assert liability under the control person provision
may signify that the Commission simply wants to avoid attacking big time
Wall Street executives.180 While it may be extreme to suggest that the SEC is
in bed with the executives, it seems that the regulatory agency is, at the very
least, afraid to pull back the covers. If the SEC wants to accomplish its goal
of protecting investors and promoting efficient markets, it should address
corporate misconduct at the source-the individuals who manage or monitor
publicly-held corporations.
Perhaps in part to placate criticisms by Senator Elizabeth Warren, the
media, and others, the Department of Justice recently announced in a memo
that it would begin to pursue corporate individual wrongdoers more
vigorously.181 This memo, issued by Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian
Yates, posits that holding individuals accountable provides deterrence,
incentivizes proper corporate conduct, ensures that responsible parties are
held liable, and promotes public confidence in the government's oversight of
corporations.1 82 In recent comments, Ms. Yates recognized that addressing
179

180

See cases cited supra note 178; see also An M. Berman, How PE Firms Can Mitigate SecondaU
Liabiity Risks, LAW360 (Mar. 5, 2015, 2:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
514586/how-pe-firms-can-mitigate-secondary-liability-risks (noting that control person
claims are a "staple" of private class action litigation).
See WARREN REPORT, supra note 11, at 1 ("The Secudies and Exchage Commission (SEC) is

particularlyfeeble, often faing to use the full range of its enforcement toolbox. Not only does the
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agency fail to demand accountability, the SEC frequently uses its prosecutorial discretion
to grant waivers to big companies so that those companies can continue to enjoy special
privileges despite often-repeated misconduct that legally disqualifies them from receiving
such benefits.") (emphasis added). One commentator has even suggested that the SEC
has gone so far as to cover up the "crimes" of Wall Street Executives. Matt Taibi, Is the
SEC Coveindg Up Wall Street Crmes?, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/is-the-sec-covering-up-wall-street-crimes20110817.
Yates Memo, supra note 136. Early reports indicate that the Department of Justice is
pleased with the effect of the Yates memo on corporate compliance. See Che Odom,
justice Department Seeing Cooperationfrom Companies in Response to Yates Memo, 48 SEC. REG.
L. REP. (BNA) 988 (May 16, 2016). However, in the context of this Article, we focus on
the DOJ's rationale in issuing this memo.
Yates Memo, supra note 136, at 1 ("One of the most effective ways to combat corporate
misconduct is by seeking accountability from the individuals who perpetrated the
wrongdoing. Such accountability is important for several reasons: it deters future illegal
activity, it incentivizes changes in corporate behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are
held responsible for their actions, and it promotes the public's confidence in our justice
system.").
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corporate misconduct is not simply about obtaining the most money possible;
indeed, more good is done by punishing those responsible. 83
While the Department of Justice has vowed to prosecute individuals both
criminally and civilly through the Yates Memo mandate, the SEC has sat idly
by, even though it has civil enforcement authority, including under the
control person provision. In her remarks, Deputy Attorney General Yates
recognized that it is frequently difficult to reach those most responsible for
corporate wrongdoing, observing that the lines of illegality are often blurred
and that it can be difficult to determine when a CEO or other insiders were
part of a fraudulent scheme.184
By contrast, under the control person
provision of Section 20(a), the SEC is not required to plead whether the
participant had the requisite intent; nor must the Commission determine
whether the control person actually engaged in the violative conduct-control
person liability can be asserted simply because the control person had the
requisite power to control the activities of the person who engaged in the
misconduct.185 Therefore, the SEC, from a civil enforcement posture, has
more deterrent power than does even the Department of Justice in promoting
compliance, but it refuses to invoke this power.
Furthermore, by refusing to assert control person liability, the SEC is
ignoring what could be one of its strongest enforcement tools-namely, the
corporate individual's selfish desire for self-preservation.1 86 The SEC should
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See Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Deputy Attorney General Sally Q.
Yates Delivers Remarks at the New York City Bar Association White Collar Crime
Conference (May 10, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorneygeneral-s ally-q-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-city-b ar-association ("But now, the focus
of our civil enforcement efforts has broadened. We recognize that our obligation is about
more than recovering the most money from the greatest number of companies. It's also
about deterrence, about stopping fraud from happening in the first place and about
redressing misconduct of those responsible. There is a real deterrent value in the prospect
of being named in a civil suit or having a civil judgment. And this kind of deterrence can
change corporate conduct.").
Id "[T]hese cases do have a special set of challenges, challenges that can impede our
ability to identify the responsible parties and to bring them to justice. It is not easy to
disentangle who did what within a huge corporate structure - to dscern whetber anjone had

the requisite knowledge and intent. Blurred lines of authority make it hard to identf who is
responsiblefor ind4idual business decisions and it can be dificult to determine whetber begh-ranking
executives, who appear to be removedfrom dajy-to-da operations, were part of a particularscheme.")
185
186

(emphasis added).
See discussion supra notes 23-45 and accompanying text.
See David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidedng Coporate Crminal Prosecution, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1235, 1273-74 (2016) (speaking in the criminal law context: "Given
the pernicious harm and lawless conduct inherent in corporate crime, both corporations

11:2 (2017)

The Laxty at the Gates

241

use the control person provision as a deterrent mechanism to promote
compliance with securities law and to facilitate enhanced corporate
governance practices. Also, using Section 20(a) in the same way that private
plaintiffs do-to seek a more beneficial monetary settlement-will likely
result in more meaningful relief.1 87 While this rationale may not satisfy those
who want to see culpable executives incarcerated, it would at the very least
allow the Commission to achieve meaningful equitable and monetary relief
against these individuals, including the procurement of injunctions, bar
orders, and monetary penalties. 88 These actions would also put the word out
to Wall Street that the SEC is receptive to naming control persons in its
complaints. Unfortunately, however, that simply is not the case in practice.
In the hundreds of cases that proceed in federal courthouses, gatekeepers are
rarely, if ever, named as control persons in SEC enforcement actions.' 89
B. SEC's Concern over Losing at Trial
The SEC may also worry that an increase in control person claims will
lead to an increase in cases going to trial or more losses at the summary
judgment stage of litigation.1 90 A former SEC enforcement director
commented that "as the agency gets tougher [and] demands more, more and
more people are willing to go to trial, and the risk, I think, for the agency's
trial record is increasing."191 Could the SEC be protecting its litigation
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188
189
190

191

and individuals should be held accountable when wrongdoing occurs in the corporate
setting. At a minimum, prosecutors and investigators should have the ability to consider
charges against both corporations and individuals, so that the full range of enforcement
options are available to address corporate misconduct.").
See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merts Matter? A Stud of Settlements in Securiies Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 530-31 (1991) (Noting that it is always advantageous for
the plaintiff in a securities case to name directors and officers as individual defendants
because they are inherently more risk averse than entity defendants. Thus, the individual
defendants will be more likely to settle cases even when the cost of such settlements is
higher than the potential outcome at trial; it simply is not worth the risk for these
individuals.).
See Marc I. Steinberg & Ralph C. Ferrara, 25 SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE
ENFORCEMENT i 5.2, 5.9 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2016).
See discussion supra notes 174--78 and accompanying text.
See Rob Tricchinelli, SEC Enforcement Wi/ Be Aggressive, but Lack of Cladly Problematic, Panel
Says, BLOOMBERG BNA Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.bna.com/sec-enforcement-will-beaggressive-but-lack-of-clarity-problematic-panel-says/.
Id. (statement of William R. McLucas, partner and leader of the securities department at
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP). This practice is consistent with the SEC's
long-standing approach to adjudicate roughly 90% of its enforcement actions pursuant to
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record? Under the current model, defendant corporations are willing to
consent to large monetary settlements when insiders are not named and the
corporation does not admit fault.1 92 Indeed, in the Citigroup matter, the
Commission drew the ire of U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff who
refused to approve the SEC's $285 million settlement. 93

&

the settlement negotiation process, where the defendant neither admits nor denies
wrongdoing. See, e.g., SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 308-09
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). Discussing the history of the practice, the court stated:
Long before 1972, the S.E.C. had already begun entering into consent decrees in which
the defendants neither admitted nor denied the allegations. This was strongly desired by
the defendants because it meant that their agreement to the S.E.C.'s settlements would
not have collateral estoppel consequences for parallel private civil actions, in which the
defendants frequently faced potential monetary judgments far greater than anything the
S.E.C. was likely to impose. But there were benefits for the S.E.C. as well. First, the
practice made it much easier for the S.E.C. to obtain settlements. And second, at a time
(prior to 1972) when the S.E.C.'s enforcement powers were largely limited to obtaining
injunctive relief, the S.E.C.'s focus was somewhat more centered on helping to curb
future misconduct by obtaining access to the Court's contempt powers than on obtaining
admissions to prior misconduct.
But, by 1972, it had become obvious that as soon as courts had signed off on such
settlements, the defendants would start public campaigns denying that they had ever done
what the S.E.C. had accused them of doing and claiming, instead, that they had simply
entered into the settlements to avoid protracted litigation with a powerful administrative
agency. Thus, the real change effected by the S.E.C. in 1972 was the requirement that a
defendant who agreed to a consent judgment "without admitting or denying the
allegations of the Complaint" nevertheless agree that the defendant would not thereafter
publicly deny the allegations. To this end, each of the proposed Consent Judgments now
presented to this Court is accompanied by a formal written "Consent" of the defendant
agreeing, pursuant to 17 C.F.R § 205.5, "not to take any action or to make or permit to be
made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint
or creating the impression that the complaint is without factual basis."
The result is a stew of confusion and hypocrisy unworthy of such a proud agency as the
S.E.C. The defendant is free to proclaim that he has never remotely admitted the terrible
wrongs alleged by the S.E.C.; but, by gosh, he had better be careful not to deny them
either (though, as one would expect, his supporters feel no such compunction). Only one
thing is left certain: the public will never know whether the S.E.C.'s charges are true, at
least not in a way that they can take as established by these proceedings.
Id. For other cases criticizing the SEC's use of settlement agreements where the
defendants are not required to admit fault, see, e.g., SEC v. Van Gilder, [2014 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 97,938 (D. Colo. 2014); SEC v. Dennis, 46 Sec. Reg.
L. Rep. (BNA) 807 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); SEC v. Bridge Premium Fin. LLC, 45 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 482 (D. Colo. 2013); SEC v. CR Intrinsic Investors, LLC, 939 F. Supp. 2d
431 (S.D.N.Y 2013); SEC v. Cioffi, 868 F. Supp. 2d 65 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
See discussion of settlements, supra notes 62-128 and accompanying text.
SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329-30, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011),
rev'd, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014) ("[]he S.E.C. alleged that Citigroup knew in advance
that it would be difficult to sell the Fund if Citigroup disclosed its intention to use it as a
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Judge Rakoff observed that the SEC has a "long-standing policyhallowed by history, but not by reason-of allowing corporate defendants to
enter into Consent Judgments without admitting or denying the underlying
allegations."1 94 Nonetheless, Judge Rakoffs decision was overturned by the
Second Circuit, 95 and the settlement was eventually approved some three
years later.1 96 While this litigation presented a challenge to the SEC's
settlement record, the Second Circuit's rejection ofJudge Rakoffs well-placed
concerns shows just how common these types of settlements are.1 97
Given the SEC's success in these settlements, the Commission may be
hesitant to pursue individuals who have a lot more to lose, and thus have a

194
195
196

197

vehicle to unload its hand-picked set of negatively projected assets. . . . Although this
would appear to be tantamount to an allegation of knowing and fraudulent intent ('sdenter,'
in the lingo of securities law), the S.E.C, for reasons of its own, chose to charge Citigroup
only with negligence, in violation of Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act."); id. at
333 ("The S.E.C.... took the position that, because Citigroup did not expressly deny the
allegations, the Court, and the public, somehow knew the truth of the allegations. This is
wrong as a matter of law and unpersuasive as a matter of fact. As a matter of law, an
aLlegaton that is neither admitted nor denied is simpjl that, an aLlegadon. It has no evidentiary value
and no collateral estoppel effect.... It follows that the allegations of the complaint that
gives rise to the consent judgment are not evidence of anything either.") (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
Id. at 332.
SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 2014).
Ben Protess, Judge Rakoff Says 2011 S.E.C. Deal with Gtgroup Can Close, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
5, 2014), http:/dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/after-long-fight-judge-rakoff-reluctan
tly-approves-citigroup-deal/. Compare Ciigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 752 F.3d at 289, with
SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984):
The district court believed that the purposes of the securities laws .. . required it to closely
scrutinize the proposed decree to see if it was in the public's best interest. We do not
question the appropriateness of a requirement that the decree be in the public interest.
The purpose of the securities laws is to protect the public. As the agency given the
responsibility of administering the securities laws, the SEC ought to always be required to
serve the public interest. That does not mean, however, the district court should have
conditioned approval of the consent decree on what it considered to be the public's best
interest. Instead, the court should have deferred to the agency's decision that the decree is
appropriate and simply ensured that the proposed judgment is reasonable.
(citation omitted).
On the other hand, the fact that Judge Rakoff felt that Citigroup was able to evade justice
by negotiating a relatively light settlement with the SEC may suggest that the Commission
would have success in bringing individual actions under control person liability, at least in
Judge Rakoffs court.
For further discussion of Judge Rakoffs view toward the
accountability of individuals responsible for the financial collapse, see Jed S. Rakoff, The
FinandalCrisis: Whj Have No Hgh-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan.
9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-execut
ive-prosecutions/.
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greater incentive to contest the SEC's claims.' 98 While it may be true that
more individual civil prosecutions could result in more cases being contested,
the SEC should invoke its enforcement resources to fulfill its enforcement
mandate as directed in the Securities Acts.
C. Use of Control Person Liability Is Not Inconsistent with
Current Policy
In allaying concerns by directors, executive officers, and their lawyers, the
SEC has made repeated assertions that it is not seeking to punish directors for
unintended mistakes. For instance, in a recent statement, Lara Shalov
Mehrabahn, Associate Director for a SEC regional office, said that
"[e]nforcement isn't second guessing good-faith decisions by the board, but
rather bringing cases where directors have either taken affirmative steps to
participate in fraud or enabled fraudulent conduct by unreasonably turning a
blind eye to obvious red flags."1 99 Given this statement, control person
liability should be a preferred tool for implementing the SEC's policy as it
provides for good faith as an affirmative defense. 200
Additionally, SEC actions under the control person provision of Section
20(a) should be a preferred enforcement tool. Under its current approach to
holding individuals accountable, the Commission invokes primary and aider
and abettor liability rationales.
The control person provision, a more
attractive enforcement tool as discussed above, lends itself to the initiation of
meaningful enforcement actions directed against gatekeepers, thus promoting
compliance with the law and enhanced corporate governance practices.
Recently, the Commission has sought to strengthen financial
transparency by instituting actions relating to alleged deficiencies in internal

198

199
200

See, e.g., SEC v. Schvacho, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (holding that the SEC
provided insufficient evidence to prove insider trading allegations under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5, Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act,
and under Rule 14e-3); SEC v. Jensen, No. CV 11-5316-R, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173532
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013) (holding that the SEC did not carry its burden of proof in
charging defendants with violations of Sections 17(a), 10(b), and 13(a)). Note, however,
that all of these decisions where the SEC lost were premised on a primary liability theory,
as opposed to the control person provision.
Stephen Joyce, SEC Wil Onl Target Directors in Egregious Cases, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb.
11, 2016), http://www.bna.com/sec-target-directors-n57982067229/ (emphasis added).
For discussion of good faith defense, see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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control over financial reporting ("ICFR").201 Violations for ICFR stem from
Section 13(b) of the Exchange Act, which requires publicly-held companies to
keep and maintain a reliable system of internal accounting controls sufficient
to provide reasonable assurance that the company's transactions are recorded
in order to permit preparation of financial statements that conform with
generally accepted accounting principles. 202 Likewise, Rule 13a-15(a) requires
that subject issuers maintain internal control over financial reporting. 2 03
In certain cases, the Commission has sought to impose liability against
companies when only ICFR violations are alleged. 204 In one case, the
Commission instituted proceedings against a rapidly growing oil and gas
company.205 The SEC alleged that the company had deficient ICFR,
including inadequate staffing, significant delays in financial reporting, and
limited or incomplete documentation of the company's accounting
deficiencies. 206 Based purely on ICFR violations, the SEC levied penalties
against the company as well as its Chief Financial Officer. 207

201

See Jason M. Halper, SEC Enforcement and Internal Control Failures, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 4, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016

/05/04/sec-enforcement-and-internal-control-failures/;
David Woodcock, Ina,/i iduals in the Crosshairs? What this Meansfor Directors, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 17, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.

202
203

204
205
206
207

edu/2016/03/17/individuals-in-the-cross-hairs-what-this-means-for-directors/
("The
board's oversight role, usually through the audit committee, is critical because the SEC is
keenly interested in the state of a company's internal controls. All financial reporting and
disclosure investigations will involve a detailed look at a company's internal controls, and
most of these investigations will involve an analysis and investigation into the board's
oversight over financial reporting and internal controls.").
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. ( 78m(b)(2)(B) (2012).
This provision applies to issuers whose securities are registered under Section 12 of the
Exchange Act, and who thereby are required to issue annual reports. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a15(a) (2014) ("Every issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12
of the Act (15 U.S.C. 781), other than an Asset-Backed Issuer, a small business investment
company registered on Form N-5, or a unit investment trust as defined in section 4(2) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-4(2)), must maintain disclosure
controls and procedures and, if the issuer either had been required to file an annual report
pursuant to section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Act for the prior fiscal year or had filed an annual
report with the Commission for the prior fiscal year, internal control over financial
reporting.") (citations omitted).
E.g., Magnum Hunter Res. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 77,345, 2016 WL 929381
(Mar. 10, 2016).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5-10.
Id. at *10 (instituting a $250,000 civil penalty against the company, as a well as requiring it
to cease and desist from future violations of Section 13); Ronald D. Ormand, Exchange
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Officials within the SEC have stressed the importance of pursuing these
"minor" violations, in order to promote a "culture" of compliance. 208 SEC
Chair Mary Jo White has touted this practice of pursuing minor violations as
the "broken windows" approach to enforcement. 209 Although the Chair's talk
is tough, these actions generally have focused on smaller issuers.210
Furthermore, commentators question whether the SEC's broken windows
approach has had any deterrent effect; it seems that issuers and executives
may view these types of sanctions simply as a risk of doing business. 211
If the Commission was actually interested in promoting a culture of
compliance, it would have the perfect tools in Sections 20(a) and 15(b) (6) (A)
of the Exchange Act. Using these enforcement mechanisms, the SEC would
not be confined to alleging primary or aiding and abetting liability. Rather,
invoking these provisions, the Commission could institute proceedings

208

209

210

211

Act Release No. 77,346, 2016 WL 929382, at *10 (Mar. 10, 2016) (instituting a $25,000
civil penalty against the company's CFO).
See White, supra note 22 ("[Minor violations that are overlooked or ignored can feed
bigger ones, and, perhaps more importantly, can foster a culture where laws are
increasingly treated as toothless guidelines. And so, I believe it is important to pursue
even the smallest infractions.").
Id. ("W]e are looking for the 'broken windows' in our markets - and not overlooking the
small violations to avoid breeding an environment of indifference to our rules.").
E.g., SEC v. DGSE Cos. Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 23003, 2014 WL 2203789, at *1
(May 27, 2014) ("[D]eficiencies in DGSE's accounting systems and controls led to
problems that significantly compromised the integrity of the company's financial data.
The deficiencies included the failure to properly record intercompany transactions such as
inventory transfers between stores. As a result, DGSE's intercompany accounts became
out of balance by millions of dollars."); Medifast, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 70,448,
2013 WL 5275765, at *1 (Sept. 18, 2013) ("Medifast had improperly accounted for its
income tax provision for the affected years, which resulted in material understatements of
its income tax expense and material overstatements of its net income after tax. Medifast's
inaccurate financial statements resulted in part from improper accounting that did not
comply with generally accepted accounting principles ('GAAP'), and from a deficient
system of internal controls that failed to ensure the appropriate recording and reporting of
its income tax expense.").
See on Eisenberg, Reiew of 2015 SECActions Against Broker-Dealers:Part1, LAW360 (Dec.
15, 2015, 11:41 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/737626/review-of-2015-secactions-against-broker-dealers-part-1 ("It is unclear what impact, if any, the brokenwindows policy has had on the enforcement program because, even before the brokenwindows speech, the commission's enforcement program was never limited to violations
requiring proof of intent. For example, delinquent filing cases would appear to be the
quintessential broken-windows type of case. The commission brought 107 such cases in
2014 (the year following the speech), but in the two years preceding White's brokenwindows speech it brought 121 and 127 such cases. Thus, the number of delinquent filing
cases went down after her broken-windows speech.").
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against higher-ups and other gatekeepers based on a violation of the federal
securities laws committed by those persons under their control. Thus,
effective use of Sections 20(a) and 15(b)(6) (A) will enable the Commission to
pursue gatekeepers with vigor. 2 12
VI. CONCLUSION

The financial crisis and subsequent episodes of major corporate financial
misconduct have shed light on the importance of adequate and consistent
corporate governance. 213 The SEC has frequently stressed the importance of
holding "gatekeepers" accountable in order to achieve stronger corporate
governance practices. 214 However, for the most part, the Commission has
been unwilling to put its money where its mouth is. As addressed above, the
SEC has two major tools with which to hold executives and directors
accountable for their failure to adequately oversee those under their control.
Through the use of Section 20(a), the SEC has within its tool chest the
power to hold "control persons" liable for the actions of those that they
oversee, even when the control person did not commit the underlying
violation(s) at issue. 215 Further, invocation of this provision would provide a
powerful incentive for executives and directors to more deeply acknowledge
that their respective companies must comply with the law-or face the
sobering reality of being named in an SEC enforcement action. Likewise,
Section 15(b)(6)(A) of the Exchange Act allows for directors, officers, and
other overseers in the brokerage firm setting to be held responsible for their
failure to reasonably supervise those individuals under their control who
commit specified securities law violations. 216 Without explanation, the
Commission has declined to meaningfully utilize these provisions, and instead
has tended to pursue gatekeepers only if they commit or aid in a primary
violation. Indeed, with respect to the "big players" on Wall Street, the SEC
has declined to pursue any individual liability at all, except on rare occasions.
Examples from the financial crisis as well as more recent debacles evince
an unwillingness on the part of the SEC to pursue control persons whose
allegedly culpable failures to adequately monitor the actions of individuals
under their control have resulted in billions of dollars in losses to investors.
212

See discussion supra notes 29-61 and accompanying text.

213
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For discussion of major settlements, see supranotes 62-133 and accompanying text.
See Stein, supranote 25.
See supra notes 23-61 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes

214

23-61 and accompanying text.
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Citizens and public servants alike have urged the Commission to take a
tougher stance against those who should be held responsible for widespread
economic damage. 217 To make this a reality, the SEC should fulfill its
statutory directive by utilizing the powerful enforcement tools that it has been
provided. By doing so in a reasoned and good faith manner, improved
compliance with the securities laws and enhanced corporate governance
practices will eventuate.

217

See, e.g., WARREN REPORT,

supra note 11.

